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SUMMARY TABLE 
 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Output (Real Annual Growth %) 
     
Private Consumer Expenditure 3.6 4.0 1.6 2.6 2.3 
Public Net Current Expenditure 1.4 3.5 3.9 4.5 5.0 
Investment 50.8 51.7 -31.0 -6.3 9.8 
Exports 39.3 4.4 7.8 8.7 5.2 
Imports 33.2 18.5 -9.4 1.7 6.3 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 25.1 5.0 7.2 8.2 4.2 
Gross National Product (GNP) 13.8 11.5 4.4 7.8 3.8 
      
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
     
Consumer Price Index (CPI) -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.1 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 2.8 2.5 1.5 2.6 2.9 
      
Labour Market 
     
Employment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 2,057 2,132 2,194 2,258 2,331 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 226 195 158 142 118 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 10.0 8.4 6.7 5.7 5.1 
      
Public Finance 
     
General Government Balance (€bn) -4.9 -1.5 -0.8 -1.5 -2.4 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -1.9 -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 76.8 73.4 68.4 64.3 62.0 
      
External Trade 
     
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) 11.6 -11.4 24.9 38.4 36.3 
Current Account (% of GNP) 5.8 -5.1 10.7 15.2 13.6 
 
Note:  Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Quar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  W i nt er  201 8  |  i i i  
 
 
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2017 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 96.6 99.9 3.1 1.3 1.6 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27.8 29.6 6.5 2.5 3.9 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 97.6 69.0 -29.3 2.4 -31.0 
Exports of Goods and Services 328.2 352.6 7.4 -0.3 7.8 
Physical Changes in Stocks 6.4 3.5 
   
Final Demand 557.0 554.6 -0.4 0.5 -0.9 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  271.1 263.3 -7.9  1.6 -9.4 
Statistical Discrepancy 2.1 2.8 
   
GDP at Market Prices 273.2 294.1 7.6 0.4 7.2 
Net Factor Payments  -51.1 -61.0 
   
GNP at Market Prices 222.2 233.1 4.9 0.5 4.4 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.3 4.2 0.9 27.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 81.8 85.7 3.9 4.7 
Other 102.2 113.3 11.1 10.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 1.1 0.0 
  
Statistical Discrepancy 0.5 -2.8 
  
Net Domestic Product 236.7 250.6 13.9 5.9 
Net Factor Payments -51.1 -61.0 -9.9 19.3 
National Income 185.6 189.6 4.0 2.2 
Depreciation 63.9 72.0 8.1 12.6 
GNP at Factor Cost 249.5 261.6 12.1 4.8 
Taxes less Subsidies -27.4 -28.4 -1.1 3.9 
GNP at Market Prices 222.2 233.1 11.0 4.9 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
  
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 42.4 89.3 46.9 
F -49.9 -59.8 -9.9 
Net Transfers -3.8 -4.6 -0.8   
Balance on Current Account -11.4 24.9 36.3 
as % of GNP -5.1 10.7 15.6 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2018 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 99.9 104.0 4.1 1.5 2.6 
Public Net Current Expenditure 29.6 31.8 7.5 2.9 4.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 69.0 67.0 -3.0 3.6 -6.3 
Exports of Goods and Services 352.6 383.5 8.8 0.0 8.7 
Physical Changes in Stocks 3.5 3.0 
   
Final Demand 554.6 589.3 6.3 0.9 5.3 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  263.3 269.1 2.2 0.5 1.7 
Statistical Discrepancy 2.8 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 294.1 320.2 8.9 0.6 8.2 
Net Factor Payments  -61.0 -67.1 
   
GNP at Market Prices 233.1 253.1 8.6 0.7 7.8 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 4.2 4.3 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 85.7 90.7 5.0 5.8 
Other 113.3 117.0 3.7 3.3 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.0 0.0 
 
 
Statistical Discrepancy -2.8 0.1   
Net Domestic Product 250.6 273.2 22.7 9.0 
Net Factor Payments -61.0 -67.1 -6.1 10.1 
National Income 189.6 206.1 16.5 8.7 
Depreciation 72.0 74.8 2.8 3.9 
GNP at Factor Cost 261.6 280.9 19.3 7.4 
Taxes less Subsidies -28.4 -27.8 0.6 -2.1 
GNP at Market Prices 233.1 253.1 19.9 8.6 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 89.3 114.4 25.1 
F -59.8 -70.8 -11.1 
Net Transfers -4.6 -5.1 -0.6   
Balance on Current Account 24.9 38.4 13.5 
as % of GNP 10.7 15.2 5.3 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2019 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 104.0 108.2 4.0 1.7 2.3 
Public Net Current Expenditure 31.8 33.9 6.6 1.5 5.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 67.0 75.5 12.8 2.7 9.8 
Exports of Goods and Services 383.5 407.1 6.2 1.0 5.2 
Physical Changes in Stocks 3.0 3.0 
   
Final Demand 589.3 627.8 6.5 1.3 5.1 
less:    
   
Imports of Goods and Services  269.1 289.4 7.6 1.2 6.3 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 320.2 338.3 5.7 1.4 4.2 
Net Factor Payments  -67.1 -71.7 
   
GNP at Market Prices 253.1 266.6 5.3 1.5 3.8 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 4.3 4.3 0.1 1.4 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 90.7 96.0 5.3 5.9 
Other 117.0 120.1 3.1 2.6 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.0 0.0 
  
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.1 
  
Net Domestic Product 273.2 289.4 16.2 5.9 
Net Factor Payments -67.1 -71.7 -4.6 6.8 
National Income 206.1 217.7 11.6 5.6 
Depreciation 74.8 77.5 2.7 3.6 
GNP at Factor Cost 280.9 295.2 14.3 5.1 
Taxes less Subsidies -27.8 -28.6 -0.7 2.6 
GNP at Market Prices 253.1 266.6 13.5 5.3 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 114.4 117.7 3.3 
F -70.8 -75.7 -4.8 
Net Transfers -5.1 -5.7 -0.6   
Balance on Current Account 38.4 36.3 -2.2 
as % of GNP 15.2 13.6 -0.8 
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The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview 
 
The Irish economy looks set to register another very strong year of growth in 
2018, with the outlook remaining positive as well for 2019. While difficulties 
persist with the interpretation of the National Accounts, it is fair to say that the 
growth performance in 2018 has been broadly based with both domestic and 
external factors contributing significantly to the growth performance. 
 
Overall, while headline GDP suggests a growth rate of over 8 per cent for the 
economy, underlying economic activity grew somewhere in the region of 4.5 to 5 
per cent.  
 
While the outlook for 2019 is also positive for the Irish economy, next year will 
see a number of significant challenges mainly from an international perspective. 
The outcome of the Brexit process is particularly important. A relatively benign 
UK exit such as the establishment of a European Economic Area agreement would 
see the Irish economy grow by 3 per cent in 2019, compared to a 4 per cent 
outcome where the UK remains in the EU. If the United Kingdom were to leave 
under a WTO style agreement, then Irish economic activity in 2019 would grow 
by just over 2.5 per cent in 2019. The forecasts of the Commentary assume the 
UK’s continuation of effective membership within the EU. 
 
Notwithstanding the challenges posed by international developments, the 
persistently strong growth rate of the domestic economy does lead to questions 
as to the sustainability of economic performance going forward. In a Research 
Note to the Commentary, McQuinn addresses the implications of increased 
residential activity in terms of the labour market and the financial sector. Overall, 
while both credit and employment levels associated with construction are quite 
low at present, a significant increase in housing supply would likely see a sizeable 
increase in both the balance sheets of the Irish banking sector and the rate of 
inward net migration. 
 
Budget 2019 saw both current and capital expenditure set to increase 
considerably over the next year. The scale of the increased expenditure has 
inevitable implications for the public finances with a deficit now likely in 2019. 
Prior to the Budget, a surplus had seemed a likely outcome. Some of this 
increased expenditure is due to budget overruns in the key health portfolio. 
Another key feature of the public finances in 2018 is the significant increase in 
corporation tax receipts. 
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In another Special Article to this Commentary, Roantree et al. (2018) examine the 
budgetary package from a distributional perspective. Their analysis suggests that 
relative to a neutral benchmark, where all thresholds, duties and benefit 
payments rose in line with forecast wage growth, the budget resulted in 
households’ disposable income being 0.66 per cent less than the benchmark 
level. The difference between the benchmark level and actual incomes were 
largest, on average, for lone parents, retirees, and lower-income households.  
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The International Economy 
 
International developments in 2018 have been largely shaped by increased global 
trade tensions, uncertainties around Brexit and the Federal Reserve’s continued 
interest rate increases in response to growing inflationary pressure. As 2018 
progresses, economic headwinds have reduced growth relative to 2017. These 
pressures include increased financial stress, heightened trade barriers and 
increased debt levels among emerging market nations. These growing concerns 
are reflected in recent updates to the IMF’s global economic outlook, 
downgrading world output growth to 3.7 per cent for both 2018 and 2019.1 
 
According to preliminary estimates of year-on-year real GDP growth, economic 
activity in the European Union continues to slow, falling from 2.1 per cent in Q2 
2018 to 1.9 per cent Q3 2018. This slowdown is felt most strongly in Italy, with a 
0.8 per cent growth rate, far below the EU average. As of September 2018, 
unemployment has fallen to 8.1 per cent for the Euro Area with rates ranging 
from a low of 2.3 per cent in the Czech Republic to a high of 19.0 per cent in 
Greece. As of October 2018, the ECB has tapered quantitative easing to €15 
billion per month and is likely to end net purchases in January 2019. Interest rate 
increases are expected to be introduced after the summer of 2019. Inflation in 
the Euro Area averaged 2.1 per cent in Q3 2018, reaching 2.2 per cent as of 
October 2018.  
 
While real GDP growth in the UK has trended downwards since Q1 2015, the past 
two quarters of activity suggest the economy has recently gained momentum. 
Real GDP grew by 1.5 per cent in Q3 2018 relative to the same period last year. 
Figure 1 details recent activity in both the labour market and domestic sales. 
Retail sales of household goods have recovered in 2018, with seasonally-adjusted 
values averaging an increase of 7.6 per cent between July and September. 
Unemployment has continued to remain low throughout the year, most recently 
averaging 4.1 per cent between July and September.  
 
However, strong inflationary pressure has caused real earnings to decline since 
November 2016. While British incomes have stalled, Figure 1 suggests 
expenditure is rising both in terms of volume and through increased prices. 
According to a recent ONS article, expenditure outweighed personal incomes by 
 
                                                          
 
1  International Monetary Fund, 2018. World Economic Outlook: Challenges to Steady Growth, Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, October 2018. 
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an average of £900 per UK household in 2017, making households net borrowers 
for the first time since 1988.2  
 
FIGURE 1 KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF UK, YEAR-ON-YEAR (%) 
  
 
Sources:  ONS, Retail sales, Great Britain: September 2018 (LHS), ONS database, UK labour market: October 2018 (RHS). 
Note:  Total pay includes bonuses while regular pay excludes bonus payments. Chained Volume of Retail Sales using seasonally-
adjusted index numbers of sales per week and percentage increase on a year earlier.    
 
Investment in the UK continues to decline in 2018, which is likely due to the 
ongoing uncertainty concerning key Brexit negotiations. As displayed in Figure 2, 
growth rates in total, private and construction investment have trended 
downwards over the past five years, and are now experiencing negative growth 
rates. The large surge in investment among UK financial institutions in 2017 
appears to have reversed in recent quarters. This surge included the UK’s highest 
annual acquisition of short-term assets since 2007, a common sign of uncertain 
investors shifting towards liquid portfolios. While the UK has a history of net 
investment over the last three decades, recent data for Q1 and Q2 of 2018 
suggest the UK could experience a historically high level of disinvestment among 
domestic financial institutions. 
 
 
                                                          
 
2  Office of National Statistics, 2018. ‘Making ends meet: are households living beyond their means?’, July 2018. 
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FIGURE 2 UK BUSINESS INVESTMENT YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH (%) AND UK FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION NET INVESTMENT (£MILLION) 
   
 
Source:  ONS, Business investment real-time database (LHS),  
ONS, Investment by insurance companies, pension funds and trusts: April to June 2018 (RHS). 
 
As of late November 2018, the European Council has endorsed the Agreement on 
the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. While the 
proposed Withdrawal Agreement has been met with mixed reception in British 
Parliament, a meaningful vote on the potential deal will not occur until December 
11th 2018. The draft proposes a transition period until the end of 2020. During 
this period the UK will be able to continue participating in the EU Customs Union 
and the Single Market, enabling all four freedoms of movement.  
 
As part of this agreement, the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, 
commonly referred to as the Irish backstop agreement, will be effective from the 
end of the transition period onwards. Until a subsequent agreement is negotiated 
between Europe and the UK, the backstop would enable a ‘single EU-UK customs 
territory’.3 The UK’s National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) 
has published a report detailing the estimated effects of the proposed Brexit deal 
through use of their global macroeconomic model, NiGEM.4 Relative to the most 
beneficial scenario of the UK staying in the EU, all other scenarios result in 
 
                                                          
 
3  A Singles Customs Territory would require the UK to align with EU tariffs and regulations. There would be no trade 
barriers such as tariffs, quotas or checks on rules of origin excluding cases for fishing and aquaculture products. The 
UK would be unable to lower customs tariffs below the EU Common Customs Tariff. Under this arrangement, 
Northern Ireland’s businesses may export products to EU’s internal market without restriction. Products from outside 
of Northern Ireland would require that the processes provided for in the Union Customs Code would have to be 
applied. 
4  Hantzsche, A., A. Kara and G. Young (2018). ‘The Economic Effects of the Government’s Proposed Brexit Deal’, the 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR). 
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economic losses. The currently proposed deal strikes a middle-ground of losses, 
wedged between potential upsides of an Irish backstop scenario and downsides 
of an orderly no-deal outcome. By 2030, the report estimates the proposed deal 
will result in GDP losses of £1,090 per head (overall GDP down 3.9 per cent) 
relative to a ‘stay’ scenario. In a separate study, the London School of Economics 
(LSE), King’s College London and the Institute for Fiscal Studies have jointly 
modelled the consequences of the proposed Brexit deal relative to a baseline of 
continued EU membership.5 Between 2020 and 2030, the report estimates lower 
GDP per capita, ranging from 1.9 per cent to 5.5 per cent, relative to continued 
EU membership. In the Output section of the Commentary we examine the 
implications for the short-run domestic forecast of different Brexit scenarios. 
 
The US economy grew at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent in Q3 2018. Personal 
consumption contributed 2.7 percentage points towards this increase. As of 
October 2018, the US unemployment rate declined to 3.7 per cent, a level 
consistent with full employment. The outlook for inflation remains on target 
following the Federal Reserve raising the official US interest rate to a range of 2 
to 2.25 per cent in September 2018. Given the strong inflationary pressure 
introduced by a combination of stimulatory fiscal policy, tightened labour market 
conditions and rising trade protectionism throughout 2018, a fourth increase in 
the official US interest rate range to 2.25-2.5 per cent in December 2018 seems 
likely.  
 
Trade performance for the US weakened in Q3 2018, following a 7 per cent year-
on-year decline in the export of goods and a 9 per cent increase in imports. 
Between January and September, the US trade deficit in 2018 expanded by 9.5 
per cent relative to the same period last year. Following the implementation of 
bilateral trade tariffs between July and September, Figure 3 highlights a 
significant decline in US exports. The overall impact on US-China trade has 
resulted in a 10 per cent rise in the trade deficit between January and September 
of 2018 relative to the same period last year. This extends the US-China trade 
deficit to a record high of $40 billion.  
 
 
                                                          
 
5  Levell, P., A. Menon, J. Portes and T. Sampson, (2018). ‘The Economic Consequences of the Brexit Deal’, Centre of 
Economic Performance Brexit Analysis, the London School of Economics and Political Science.  
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FIGURE 3 US-CHINA SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, Y-O-Y GROWTH (%) 
 
Source:  United States Census Bureau, US Export and Import data for goods. 
 
Real GDP in China grew year-on-year by 6.5 per cent in Q3 2018, its lowest 
increase since early 2009. Pressures in the banking sector, potential US tariff rate 
increases in January and attempts at curtailing growth in the real estate market 
appear to be impacting on growth in the Chinese economy.  
 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics’ most recent release of housing data reveals 
the annual moving average of real estate investment increased by 9.7 per cent, 
year-on-year, in October 2018. As Figure 4 highlights, activity has been primarily 
focused on residential property (+13.7 per cent) while offices and houses for 
business6 both continued to experience significant declines in investment. A 
recent moderation of activity in the Chinese real estate market comes in tandem 
with the introduction of price caps on new apartments and limitations on the 
resale of real estate purchases.  
 
 
                                                          
 
6  This is a term used by China’s national statistics office. ‘Houses for business’ represent four times the value of offices 
in China thus are a significant and unique component of commercial real estate in the sector. 
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FIGURE 4 US-CHINA SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, Y-O-Y GROWTH (%) 
 
Source:  National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
 
Real GDP in Japan grew year-on-year by 0.4 per cent for Q3 2018, following poor 
export performance and continued declines in private residential investment. 
Other developments in the Japanese economy include record levels of job 
availability, a decline in the unemployment rate to 2.3 per cent and low annual 
inflation of 0.4 per cent in September. This labour shortage is likely to contribute 
towards poor economic activity. With Japan and six other nations having ratified 
the ‘Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership’ 
(CPTPP),7 the agreement is due to come into effect at year end. This promising 
trade relationship combined with Japan’s success in forestalling potential 
automobile tariffs are targeted at boosting growth. 
 
Developments in oil prices 
As displayed in Figure 5, trends in global oil prices suggest a recent softening of 
inflationary pressure. Average oil prices from January to early November had 
increased between 33 and 37 per cent for Brent crude and WTI crude, 
respectively, relative to the same period last year. Although sanctions on the 
Iranian economy came into effect on 4 November, this restriction on supply was 
 
                                                          
 
7  The CPTPP was originally known as TPP, as Trans-Pacific Trade Agreement that had been signed in 2016 but never 
entered into force as a result of the US withdrawing. The remaining 11 nations held a formal signing ceremony for 
CPTPP, which no longer requires the participation of the US. Since agreement has been ratified by the majority of 
signatory nations, CPTPP will be effective from December 30th 2018 onwards.   
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largely outweighed by an OPEC pact formed in June 2018, which strongly boosted 
global oil production.8  
 
While concerns of a global slowdown rise and fears of an oil supply gap subside, 
both Brent and WTI crude oil prices have fallen by approximately 15 per cent 
between early October and November of 2018. Prices may fall further during the 
remainder of the year as risks of greater US-Chinese trade tensions and currency 
volatility among emerging markets threaten global demand. From an Irish 
perspective, low oil prices may lead to an extended period of low inflation and 
reduced pressures on household expenses.  
 
FIGURE 5 CRUDE OIL PRICES, NOT SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED ($ PER BARREL) 
 
Sources:  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
Note:  Q4 2018 uses average of daily prices between October 1 and November 5. 
 
Figure 6 summarises the forecasts for GDP growth produced by the major 
institutions of their respective economies. These forecasts signal a broad-based 
expectation of economic moderation across the majority of developed 
economies.  
 
 
                                                          
 
8  According to October’s Reuters survey of OPEC supply, oil production rose by 390,000 barrels per day relative to 
September 2018. 
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FIGURE 6 REAL GDP GROWTH (% CHANGE, YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
   Euro Area       United States    United Kingdom 
 
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRISH EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Goods 
Net exports of Irish goods contributed €7.4 billion to the trade surplus for Q2 
2018. In Figure 7, goods trade in Q2 2018 saw Irish exports grow at an annual rate 
of 17.8 per cent while imports increased by 3.9 per cent. Over the past four 
quarters, for every €1 worth of goods Ireland imported, the economy exported 
€2.24 worth of goods.  
 
FIGURE 7 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN TOTAL IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note: Export and Import growth rates feature on the LHS whereas € million changes in trade are highlighted by the RHS. 
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While these traded goods are owned by Irish resident firms, some of these goods 
may never physically cross the Irish border. When examining the trade of goods, 
foreign-owned Irish resident firm activities such as processing and merchanting 
must be taken into account.9 Cross-border trade captured through monthly 
merchandise-related trade statistics effectively excludes the trade of ownership 
goods (e.g. contract manufacturing, merchanting). Isolating and analysing cross-
border trade arguably enhances our understanding of domestic exporter 
activity.10 
 
In Q3 2018, seasonally-adjusted cross-border imports of goods increased by 31 
per cent relative to the same period last year. Exports increased by 18.7 per cent, 
bolstered by trade in medicinal and pharmaceutical products. Figure 8 highlights 
how the surplus experienced in the previous quarter largely outweighs recent 
negative contributions to the trade balance.  
 
FIGURE 8 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN CROSS-BORDER IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Increased cross-border exports in 2018 stem largely from chemical products, 
which grew year-on-year by 37 per cent in Q3 2018. Of these chemical products, 
medicinal and pharmaceutical exports also increased by 37 per cent. Chemical 
products accounted for two-thirds of total exports between January and 
 
                                                          
 
9  ‘Goods for processing’ is dominated by ‘Contract Manufacturing’, a process in which multinational companies 
residing in Ireland issue contracts to foreign firms to produce goods. Although these goods never enter the Irish 
economy, due to ownership of these goods pertaining to Irish resident firms, sales are recorded as an Irish export.  
‘Merchanting’ consists of the buying and selling of completed goods abroad which at no stage enter or leave Ireland.  
10  For further details on ownership trade, see CSO’s ‘Explaining Goods Exports and Imports 2012-2016’. 
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September 2018. Exports of machinery and equipment, largely represented by 
electrical machinery and office machines, have been consistently declining since 
mid-2017.  
 
Given the vulnerability of the domestic agricultural sector to Brexit, the fall in 
total food and live animal exports by 6.3 per cent relative to Q3 2017 is of note. 
Figure 10 splits food into four major sub-components, highlighting a broad-based 
decline in exports occurring across all food item types. While both the UK and EU 
contributed towards modest growth in Irish food exports, the remainder of the 
world’s demand for Irish food products declined by 16.9 per cent relative to the 
January-September period of 2017.  
  
FIGURE 9 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN CROSS-BORDER FOOD EXPORTS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
In Q3 2018, total cross-border imports of goods rose year-on-year by 30 per cent. 
This marks the highest rate of growth since Q1 2006. For the year to date, 
machinery and transport equipment products and chemicals products 
represented 40 and 24 per cent of total imports, respectively. Machinery imports 
fell by 3.3 per cent and chemicals by 0.3 per cent for the same period. 
 
Table 1 displays changes in exports and imports between regions for the year up 
to September 2018. Relative to 2017, Ireland’s three-quarter cumulative trade 
deficit with the UK increased by 60 per cent to €2.7 billion. Bilateral trade in 
chemicals and related products experienced a 15 per cent decline compared to 
the same period last year. Imports from the UK rose by 4 per cent, largely driven 
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by a 40 per cent increase in the import of gas products (natural and 
manufactured).  
 
While trade in chemical products fell with the UK, trade with Europe and the US 
appears to have increased significantly. Excluding the UK, total exports and 
imports of goods with the EU yielded double-digit growth. Imports of medicinal 
products from Germany increased by 425 per cent, up from €0.9 billion in 2017 to 
€5 billion in 2018. Overall trade with the US saw the greatest improvement 
compared to the January-September period of 2017, causing the trade surplus 
with the US to increase by 40.5 per cent (+€5.2 billion). The 15 per cent rise in 
exports was driven almost entirely by medicinal products and organic chemicals, 
with the combined value of these two items representing 66 per cent of total 
Irish goods exports to the US, relative to 55 per cent in 2017.  
 
TABLE 1 JANUARY-SEPTEMBER ANNUAL CHANGE (%) IN GOODS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS  
 
Exports Imports 
Total – UK -5 4 
 Food and live animals 1 7 
 Chemicals and related products -15 -15 
 Machinery and transport equipment -12 7 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 3 3 
   
Total – Rest of EU 16 26 
 Food and live animals 3 6 
 Chemicals and related products 29 104 
 Machinery and transport equipment -17 5 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 6 -1 
   
Total – US 15 -12 
 Food and live animals -39 19 
 Chemicals and related products 37 -45 
 Machinery and transport equipment -42 8 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 3 0 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
While the Irish trade balance for goods is currently at a surplus of €38 billion over 
the past three quarters of 2018, the surplus increases to €48 billion when 
focusing solely on chemical and related products. Given the importance of 
chemical products to Ireland’s trade surplus in goods, it is important that recently 
volatile changes in chemical trade patterns are examined in greater detail. 
Though these products are numerous in variety, medicinal products and organic 
chemicals represented 84 per cent of exported and 77 per cent of imported 
chemical and related products. Figure 10 combines these two items, displaying 
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recent quarterly exports by destination and imports by origin. Demand for 
chemical exports to Belgium and the US have grown rapidly in 2018, now 
representing 60 per cent of medicinal and organic chemical export demand. 
Growth in German imports have significantly outpaced the US for three 
consecutive quarters in 2018, contributing to the 425 per cent growth rate 
previously noted.  
 
FIGURE 10 TOTAL MEDICINAL AND ORGANIC CHEMICAL TRADE BY TOP FIVE COUNTRIES 
 A. Exports by Destination (€’000)        B. Imports by Origin (€’000) 
  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, QEC calculations. 
 
Services 
Given that two-thirds of total Irish imports are based on the purchase of foreign 
services, even marginal declines in service growth can have a significantly positive 
effect on the trade surplus. Service exports grew year-on-year by 6.7 per cent in 
Q2 2018. Imports of services declined by 10.2 per cent in Q2 2018, relative to the 
same period last year.  
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FIGURE 11 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN IRISH SERVICE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Exports of computer services in Q2 2018 increased by 18.6 per cent relative to 
the same period last year. Significant and consecutive declines in business 
services since Q2 2017 have moderated overall growth rates in service exports. 
Royalties & licenses and business services formed 71 per cent of services imports 
in Q2 2018. Successive year-on-year reductions in both items have resulted in six 
consecutive quarters of import declines, as reflected in Figure 12. Imports of 
research and development services experienced the largest annual decrease, 
falling by 68 per cent in Q2 2018.  
 
FIGURE 12 EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SERVICES (€ MILLION) 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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In terms of the overall impact on headline GDP, movements in certain elements 
of imports are expected to be offset by related movements in investment. Table 2 
highlights the relationship over the past four years between R&D service imports 
and investment into R&D. For 2018, forecasts of service imports reflect the 
Commentary’s outlook on R&D investment, in that a one-for-one investment-
import ratio is assumed in terms of the relationship between the annual values 
for fixed capital and services imports. If movements in, say, fixed capital R&D are 
not fully offset in a particular year by developments in the services imports of 
R&D, then this can cause significant fluctuations in GDP.  
 
TABLE 2 GROSS DOMESTIC PHYSICAL CAPITAL FORMATION AND SERVICE IMPORTS (€ MILLION) 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 
Fixed Capital – R&D 9,944 30,553 58,137 26,810 
Service Imports – R&D 8,704 28,158 58,052 26,832 
Inv-Imp Ratio 0.87 0.92 1.00 1.00 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Trade Balance 
The value of goods and service exports in Q2 2018 increased at an annual rate of 
11 per cent to €94 billion while imports fell by 6 per cent to €67 billion. This 
resulted in a €27 billion contribution to the Irish trade surplus, 35 per cent of 
nominal GDP for Q2 2018. Comparing cross-border trade with National Accounts 
data reveals estimates of ownership trade in the overall trade balance. Figure 13 
highlights these differences, facilitating the assessment of domestic trade activity 
and Ireland’s international competitiveness over the past ten years. Most 
notably, due to the inclusion of ownership trade, a domestic trade deficit in 2016 
(-6.4 per cent of GDP) was transformed into a major trade surplus (15.9 per cent 
of GDP).  
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FIGURE 13 CROSS-BORDER AND ADJUSTED NET EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES (€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, QEC calculations. 
Note: Adjustment to net trade accounts for ownership trade of goods. This includes, but is not limited to, forms of goods for 
processing such as contract manufacturing, and merchanting, i.e. purchase and resale of goods which do not enter the 
merchant’s economy.  
 
Due to the volatile nature of ownership trade in goods as well as services, 
forecasts in the Commentary continue to be based on trends in trade patterns 
linked to underlying Irish economic activity. QEC forecasts of exports are now 8.7 
per cent and 5.2 per cent growth in 2018 and 2019 respectively. Imports are 
expected to fall marginally by 1.7 per cent in 2018, increasing by 6.3 per cent in 
2019. The year-end current account is expected to reach €35.3 billion (14.1 per 
cent of GNP) in 2018 before falling somewhat to €32.9 billion (12.5 per cent of 
GNP) in 2019.  
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The Domestic Economy 
 
OUTPUT 
The domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors. Prices and earnings in the economy are then 
discussed, followed by a review of demand-side factors such as consumption and 
housing market issues. On the supply side, we then examine developments in 
investment and the labour market before concluding with an analysis of the 
public finances. 
 
Given the ongoing uncertainty concerning the outcome of the Brexit process, in 
the box below we illustrate the manner in which the different potential Brexit 
outcomes may impact the short-term forecast for the Irish economy. 
 
BOX 1  ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF DIFFERENT BREXIT TYPE SCENARIOS ON THE SHORT-
TERM FORECAST OF THE IRISH ECONOMY 
One particular challenge in assessing the domestic implications of Brexit is to examine 
the magnitude of the impact on short-term forecasts of the Irish economy. An increasing 
literature has sought to address the implications of Brexit on the Irish economy from a 
number of perspectives. Bergin et al. (2017) assess the implications from a 
macroeconomic perspective using COSMO – the large structural model of the Irish 
economy. The model links to an international network of models ‘NiGEM’ at the National 
Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) in the United Kingdom and as such 
focusses on the impact of Brexit through trade channels. Using a similar framework, 
Conefrey and Walsh (2018) assess the implications for Irish growth rates of the UK 
Government Brexit White Paper. Other work by Lawless (2018a; 2018b) and Lawless and 
Morgenroth (2018) assesses the implications of Brexit on the domestic economy at a 
more sectoral level. In particular, this work focusses on the impact through trade on 
intermediate goods and services. 
This box seeks to map the impacts of Brexit on the short-term forecasts of the domestic 
economy using results presented in Bergin et al. (2017). As COSMO utilises projections of 
key external variables from the NIESR NiGEM model, the model scenarios on Brexit 
produced by the NIESR are used in COSMO to model the impact of Brexit in Ireland. The 
scenarios considered are those in Ebell and Warren (2016) and comprise an EEA style 
agreement, a Switzerland/EU style of agreement (EFTA) where merchandise trade would 
be free but where EU financial services markets are not accessible to UK based 
institutions, and a WTO style agreement. The magnitudes of the impacts on trade, FDI 
and tariffs are derived by NIESR with reference to the international literature (see Ebell  
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and Warren, 2016), while the UK contribution to the EU budget is taken from HM 
Treasury and the EU.  
When these simulations are performed on the Irish economy, the potential long-term 
impact of Brexit on Ireland is severe. While the three scenarios considered include a 
whole set of international variables that are linked to COSMO, the strongest effect is a 
reduction in the trade-weighted demand or Irish exports compared to what it otherwise 
would have been. Table A summarises the impacts on the domestic economy in 2027 of 
the different scenarios. In each of the scenarios, the same mechanisms are at play but 
the impacts are weakest for the ‘EEA’ scenario and strongest in the ‘WTO’ scenario. In 
COSMO, this shock is initially transmitted to the Irish economy through the traded sector. 
The shock to foreign demand would reduce the volume of output in the traded sector 
and exports over the medium- to long-run below their baseline values. The fall in traded 
sector output leads to labour demand being below base, which has knock-on effects for 
employment and the unemployment rate. 
TABLE A  THE IMPACTS OF BREXIT ON THE IRISH ECONOMY OVER THE MEDIUM TERM (2027)  
Scenario % Deviation from Baseline  
EEA -2.3 
EFTA -2.7 
WTO -3.8 
 
Given the assessment of the longer-term impact, the question is how to relate this to 
shorter-term forecasts of the Irish economy? This is achieved by taking the changes from 
the baseline from the macroeconometric model and applying them to the short-term 
forecasts in the Commentary. The short-term forecast for the Irish economy in the 
absence of Brexit indicates GDP growth in 2019 of 4.2 per cent. We now take the 
percentage change from the baseline and apply it to the baseline GDP forecast for 2019 
in the Commentary. We then calculate the growth rate between the 2018 GDP level and 
the new adjusted 2019 GDP level in the case of the three scenarios. The results are 
presented in Table B. Note we only present the results for the EEA and the WTO 
scenarios, as the difference in Year 1 between the EEA and FTA scenarios are trivial. 
TABLE B  THE IMPACTS OF BREXIT ON THE SHORTER-TERM COMMENTARY FORECASTS 
Scenario Year GDP Level (€bn) % Growth Rate 2019/2018 
Estimate 2018 318.8  
Baseline 2019 331.5 4.2 
EEA 2019 328.6 3.2 
WTO 2019 327.1 2.8 
 
As can be seen from the Table, in both scenarios the outlook is still positive for the Irish 
economy in 2019; GDP is set to increase by 3.2 under the EEA agreement and 2.8 per 
cent under a WTO style agreement. However, even over a one-year horizon, almost  
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1.0 percentage points has been knocked off the growth rate under the relatively benign 
EEA agreement with respect to a no Brexit baseline. Under the WTO, this reduction is 
almost 1.4 percentage points. 
From a practical perspective it is worth noting that EEA membership is only possible for 
countries that are members of the EU or the EFTA. If the UK does leave the EU in March 
2019, the EEA scenario implies that the UK will have to apply for EFTA membership. The 
application process could take up to 12 months. Therefore, the EEA option is unlikely to 
impact on either Irish or UK GDP in 2019. 
It can be argued that the results presented in Table B are somewhat benign in nature as 
they assume a smooth adjustment over the long run, which is probably unrealistic. This is 
because Bergin et al. (2017) ultimately captures the long-run trade effects of Brexit. A 
variety of short-run effects such as heightened consumer and producer uncertainty, 
disruptions in financial markets and lack of access to international supply chains are not 
controlled for. However, these could be quite significant in magnitude resulting in a more 
substantial impact on the short-term outlook than suggested here. 
References: 
Bergin, A., A. Garcia-Rodriguez, E.L.W. Morgenroth and D. Smith (2017). ‘Modelling the 
Medium- to Long-Term Potential Macroeconomic Impact of Brexit on Ireland’, The 
Economic and Social Review, Vol 48(3), pp 305-316. 
Conefrey T. and G. Walsh (2018). ‘Macroeconomic implications of the UK Government 
Brexit White paper: A preliminary analysis’, Box in the Central Bank of Ireland Quarterly 
Bulletin, Q4, pp 13-17. 
Ebell, M. and J. Warren (2016). ‘The long-run economic impact of Leaving the EU’, 
National Institute Economic Review, Vol. 236, pp. 113-143. 
Lawless, M., 2018. Intermediate goods inputs and the UK content of Irish goods exports, 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
Lawless, M., 2018. ‘Irish-UK Services Trade and Brexit’, Working Paper No. WP595, 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
Lawless, M. and E. Morgenroth, 2018. ‘Brexit and Irish Consumers’, Quarterly Economic 
Commentary: Special Article, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
 
This box was prepared by Kieran McQuinn. 
 
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 
International monetary environment  
Financial market volatility increased in Q3 2018 as stock market tensions 
contributed to an increasingly uncertain outlook. Brexit and the ongoing 
discussions with the European Commission concerning the Italian budgetary 
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position were some of the reasons for the uncertainty in a European context. 
Figure 14 outlines the CBOE VIX Index, the market standard measure of volatility. 
A discernible increase in volatility since the summer is evident. 
 
FIGURE 14 VIX VOLATILITY INDEX (%) 
 
 
Source:  St Louis Fed Database, from Chicago Board Options Exchange. 
 
From a European perspective, monetary policy continues to provide a stabilising 
backstop to an increasingly uncertain environment. The Eonia rate (Figure 15) 
remains anchored at -0.4 per cent in line with the stated ECB policy of 
maintaining a negative overnight rate. Despite being committed to a removal of 
the extraordinary measures (asset purchases) from the end of 2018, the ECB 
continues to signal that policy rates will remain low into the middle of next year. 
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FIGURE 15 EURO OVERNIGHT INDEX AVERAGE, EONIA (%) 
 
Source:  European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
Figure 16 presents the ten-year government bond yields for a selected group of 
economies. As of August 2018, Irish ten-year bond yields stood at 0.85 
percentage points which was below the Eurozone average. Importantly, despite a 
peak in the first months of this year, the cost of borrowing has continued to trend 
downwards into the third quarter of 2018. This is in contrast to financing costs for 
other economies such as Italy where political tensions have led to uncertainty 
around debt sustainability. The decoupling of Ireland from other peripheral 
economies is a particular success and points towards increasing market 
confidence in Ireland’s prospects. Given the historically low Euro Area interest 
rates at present, the highly indebted position of the Irish economy suggests that 
as much low cost long-term financing as possible should be secured by the 
authorities.  
 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1
-1
9
9
9
0
1
-2
0
0
0
0
1
-2
0
0
1
0
1
-2
0
0
2
0
1
-2
0
0
3
0
1
-2
0
0
4
0
1
-2
0
0
5
0
1
-2
0
0
6
0
1
-2
0
0
7
0
1
-2
0
0
8
0
1
-2
0
0
9
0
1
-2
0
1
0
0
1
-2
0
1
1
0
1
-2
0
1
2
0
1
-2
0
1
3
0
1
-2
0
1
4
0
1
-2
0
1
5
0
1
-2
0
1
6
0
1
-2
0
1
7
0
1
-2
0
1
8
Quar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  W i nt er  201 8  |  23  
 
FIGURE 16 TEN-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND YIELD (%) 
 
Source:   St. Louis Fed. database. 
 
Household credit and mortgage market 
In Q1 2018, for the first time since 2009, the stock of outstanding mortgage 
lending as new lending outstripped repayments. This has continued into Q2 as 
mortgage lending continued to rise. Figure 17 presents the growth rates of credit 
to households from Irish resident credit institutions. The data are split by loans 
for house purchase and other personal loans (auto finance, credit cards, student 
loans etc.). On an annualised basis, outstanding mortgage lending grew by 0.7 per 
cent to Q2 2018. Non-mortgage credit also continued to expand in Q2 2018 at an 
annualised rate of 2.1 per cent. However, this represents a decline in the growth 
rate when compared with similar rates in 2017.  
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FIGURE 17 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics.  
Notes:  Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.18, Growth rates series codes 777 and 1,252.  
 
An important measure of the sustainability of activity in the mortgage market is 
the payment arrears rate. As of Q2 2018, the share of principal dwelling home 
loans in arrears stood at 6.3 per cent, down marginally on the previous quarter 
and down from 7.1 per cent year-on-year. This constitutes a total of 9.7 per cent 
of the balance of outstanding PDH mortgages. The default rate on buy-to-let 
(BTL) loans has also reduced but remains at 14.7 per cent of accounts.  
 
FIGURE 18 IRISH HOUSEHOLD MORTGAGE ACCOUNTS IN ARREARS BY TYPE OF LOAN (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Mortgage Arrears Statistics. 
Notes:  PDH refers to principal dwelling houses loans while BTL are buy-to-let loans. Loans are defined in arrears if they are greater than 
90 days past due on their payments.  
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In Q3 2018, the volume of new mortgage drawdowns increased by 14.4 per cent 
year-on-year and the value of mortgages increased by 17.5 per cent year-on-year. 
This represents a moderate deceleration in the rate of growth of the volume of 
loans. Annualised growth of close to 20 per cent was very high for any mortgage 
market, despite the fact that the number of new loans was rising from a low base. 
The slowdown noted between Q2 and Q3 2018 is to be welcomed if it signals a 
normalisation of the sector’s activity. In terms of the average loan size for 
mortgages, it was €226,250 in Q3 2018 which is marginally higher than the level 
in Q2.  
 
FIGURE 19 YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATE OF NEW MORTGAGE DRAWDOWNS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland.  
 
One interesting feature of the mortgage market has been an increase in 
‘switcher’ activity as banks have increasingly vied for increases in market share 
through refinancing activity. In a sense, as these refinancing loans do not 
represent new exposures in the market, and often provide borrowers with a 
lower cost of financing when they refinance, they do not carry the same financial 
stability risks as new loans. In fact these loans are exempt from compliance with 
the macroprudential framework if there is no increase in the loan balance. When 
these are removed from the new lending data, growth rates are lower and are 
decelerating at a significant rate. For example, in Q3 2018 the growth rate for 
loans for new house purchases excluding refinancing only stood at 8 per cent, 
with an 11 per cent annualised growth for the value of lending. This suggests that 
new mortgage lending for house purchase is softening at a quicker pace than 
suggested by the aggregate drawdown figures.  
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FIGURE 20 COMPARISON OF ANNUALISED GROWTH RATES FOR ALL LOANS VERSUS HOUSE 
PURCHASE LOANS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
 
Part of this softening is linked to a slowdown in recent house price growth, which 
has declined on an annualised basis over recent quarters. This is evident in the 
scatter plot below which focuses on the narrow window of 2017 and 2018. 
Looking at this trend, while house prices and new lending growth are positively 
correlated (depicted in the growth as the upward sloping trend line), the rates of 
both house price growth and average new lending volume growth have been 
steadily declining over time, with the lowest points on the charts representing the 
most recent data.  
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FIGURE 21 CORRELATION BETWEEN HOUSE PRICE GROWTH AND AVERAGE NEW LENDING 
VOLUME GROWTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
 
In late November 2018, the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) released their annual 
review of the macroprudential rules in the mortgage market.11 These rules are 
aimed to boost the resilience of both banks and borrowers to adverse shocks as 
well as prevent house price-credit spirals from forming like we saw in Ireland 
between 2003 and 2007. The CBI reaffirmed the current regulations and made no 
changes to the present framework. At this particular juncture, and given the 
critical supply shortages in the housing market, it is certainly prudent not to 
loosen credit conditions and risk any credit-based stimulus to house prices. The 
importance of these measures cannot be overstated in terms of their ability to 
provide a safe and sustainable mortgage market over the medium term.  
 
Trends in SME and corporate credit market 
Turning to the provision of credit to non-financial corporations, in Q2 2018 the 
overall stock of credit continued to fall with deleveraging an ongoing 
phenomenon in the sector. While the overall stock fell by 5.8 per cent on an 
annualised basis, when property and financial intermediation sectors are 
excluded the declines were more modest, at -0.7 per cent and -0.4 per cent 
respectively. These figures highlight that, while considerable deleveraging has 
occurred following the financial crisis, significant levels of debt remain. This could 
point towards potential vulnerabilities if the ultra-low interest rate environment 
were to rapidly unwind.  
 
 
                                                          
 
11  Central Bank of Ireland (2018). Mortgage Measures - Review of Residential Mortgage Lending Requirements. 
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FIGURE 22 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES (%) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics. 
Notes: Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.14, Growth rates series codes 17, 17.1 and 17.2. 
 
Often the aggregate figures conceal the difference in financing conditions 
between Irish SMEs and larger corporates operating in the Irish market. To 
understand the financing environment for SMEs, we plot the trend in new lending 
to SMEs on a quarterly rolling average basis. New lending has increased steadily 
since the middle of 2013 and continues to expand. Relative to the first three 
quarters of 2017, the level of credit to SMEs has increased for the first three 
quarters of 2018 by 11 per cent.  
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FIGURE 23 QUARTERLY NEW LENDING TO IRISH SMES BY SECTOR (FOUR-QUARTER ROLLING 
AVERAGE)  
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
 
Figure 24 presents the four-quarter rolling average of SME credit growth to the 
second quarter of 2018. This suggests that the increase in credit has been slowing 
rapidly as the economy has recovered and the SME sector has returned to more 
normal operating conditions.  
 
FIGURE 24 TREND GROWTH RATE FOR SME CREDIT (FOUR-QUARTER ROLLING AVERAGE) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
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Interest rates and the cost of finance 
The cost of finance in Ireland for both corporate and household credit remains 
high by European standards. More recently, in line with the rest of Europe, some 
reductions in lending rates are occurring. The standard variable rate on new 
mortgage loans in Ireland stood at 3.13 per cent as of Q3 2018; this is down 
slightly year-on-year from 3.41 in Q3 2017. The market for fixed rates has 
become more competitive and the average rate on one- to three-year fixed rate 
products stood at 2.82 per cent in Q3 2018. However, comparing Irish new house 
purchase loans relative to other Eurozone economies, it can be seen that interest 
rates on mortgages in Ireland remain the highest of comparator countries (Figure 
25).  
  
FIGURE 25 INTEREST RATES ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
Notes:  Countries included are: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, NL, PT, SI. These countries are selected due to data availability. Data 
differ between this chart presented and the text, as the ECB comparison data include restructured mortgages whereas the 
new business standard variable rate (SVR) is only for new drawdowns. 
 
A similar picture emerges in relation to corporate interest rates. Figure 26 
presents the interest rates on new business loans for non-financial corporates in 
Ireland relative to the average for the Eurozone. Two series are presented: 1) 
covering all loans and 2) capturing loans of less than €250,000 in value, which is 
used as a proxy for loans for SMEs. In September 2018, the average rate on new 
loans for all Irish corporates was 2.37 per cent, down marginally on the previous 
quarter. The Eurozone average was 1.65 per cent, approximately 70 basis points 
lower than the Irish rate. For small Irish corporate loans, the interest rate in 
September 2018 was 5 per cent compared to the Eurozone average of 2.27 per 
cent, a full 270 basis points higher than the Eurozone figure. Ongoing policy 
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measures to reduce the cost of financing for Irish SMEs, and to improve 
competition in the banking and other financing sectors, should continue apace.  
 
FIGURE 26 INTEREST RATES ON NEW CORPORATE LOANS – EUROPEAN COMPARISON (%)  
 
Source:  ECB MFI data. Small loans refer to loans less than €250,000. 
 
Inflation outlook 
While the early months of 2018 had seen a moderation in inflation, both the 
overall CPI and the HCPI have begun to rise into the second and third quarters of 
2018. Figure 27 presents the inflation rate for these series and the CPI excluding 
energy and unprocessed foods. While increasing inflationary pressures are 
evident from the CPI and HCPI, core inflation which excludes energy and un-
processed foods is much weaker and suggests a more muted inflation outlook for 
the domestic economy.  
 
It is interesting to explore the variation across different groups of products and 
services. In the year to October 2018, increasing prices were evident in the 
following areas: housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels (+5.5 per cent), 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco (+2.6 per cent), transport (+3.3 per cent), and 
restaurants and hotels (+2.1 per cent) and education (+1.7 per cent). Other goods 
in the economy continue to experience declines in price with furnishings, 
household equipment and routine household maintenance down 4.3 per cent, 
miscellaneous goods and services down 3.1 per cent, food and non-alcoholic 
beverages down 2.2 per cent and communications down 1.0 per cent. 
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FIGURE 27 ANNUAL GROWTH IN INFLATION (%)  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
 
The difference in price trends between the goods and services sectors is quite 
apparent. The underlying trends in the CPI (Figure 28) up to October 2018 
indicates service prices have been accelerating. It is notable that the persistent 
decline of goods prices evident from 2013 to Q2 2018 have moderated with 
goods prices only falling marginally at present.  
 
FIGURE 28 DECOMPOSITION OF ANNUAL (%) CPI GROWTH INTO GOODS AND SERVICES GROWTH 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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economy will begin to overheat, leading to upward pressure on prices and wages. 
In an accompanying note to this Commentary, McQuinn (2018) finds that while 
resources are becoming tighter in Ireland, the open nature of the economy 
should provide some spare capacity to accommodate further growth. The current 
lack of pressure on core inflation despite the rise in employment demonstrates 
the highly non-linear relationship between Irish prices and unemployment that 
would be expected by traditional relationships such as the NAIRU (Ball and 
Mankiw, 2002).12 The exposure of the Irish economy to global prices through the 
exceptionally high share of traded activity (for both exports and imports) provides 
for a much more muted reaction of prices to unemployment. However, as Figure 
29 displays, periods where the Irish unemployment rate has previously 
approached 4 per cent have been correlated with rising core inflation. As the 
economy continues to expand robustly, and if it reaches a point of near full 
employment, price rises will be much more likely.  
 
FIGURE 29 CORRELATION BETWEEN CORE CPI AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE         
(1998 M01-2018 M10) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  The fitted line is a simple quadratic fit function between the two series.  
 
In light of the Commentary’s forecast of strong domestic demand and the 
continued positive developments in the labour market performance, prices are 
expected to increase over the next two years. Consumer prices are expected to 
increase moderately by 0.6 per cent in 2018, followed by 1.1 per cent in 2019. 
 
                                                          
 
12  Ball, L. and G. Mankiw (2002). ‘The NAIRU in Theory and Practice’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (4), pp. 115-
136. 
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DEMAND 
Household sector consumption  
Growth in personal consumption has continued apace in the Irish economy 
through the first half of 2018. The most up to date Quarterly National Accounts 
show that, on an annualised basis, personal consumption expenditure increased 
by 4.8 per cent in Q2 2018. The persistent fall in unemployment, increases in 
disposable incomes and an improvement in household balance sheets have all 
contributed to the growth in household spending.  
 
FIGURE 30  QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES – CONSTANT 
MARKET PRICES AND SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Retail sales can be used as a leading indicator of consumption. These indicators 
provide a snapshot of what goods and services households are purchasing and 
what sectors are driving consumption growth in the country. Table 3 presents 
retail sales for selected items in terms of the annual growth rate in the volume of 
sales in Q3 2018. Overall retail business is up 4.6 per cent year-on-year with a 
positive growth rate in each of the retail business sectors. When the motor trade 
is excluded, sales are up by 4.3 per cent. Furniture and lighting sales continue to 
grow rapidly (up 7.7 per cent in Q3) due to the strong growth in the Irish housing 
market, while department store sales also performed well over this period (up 6.2 
per cent in Q3).  
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TABLE 3 GROWTH IN SELECT RETAIL SALES (VOLUME) ITEMS (Q3 2018) 
Retail Business - NACE REV 2 Volume of Sales 
 
Annual % change 
Motor trades 5.1 
Non-specialised stores (excluding department stores) 4.9 
Department stores 6.2 
Clothing, footwear and textiles 1.9 
Furniture and lighting 7.7 
All retail businesses 4.6 
All retail businesses, excluding motor trades 4.3 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The overall trends in retail sales are displayed in Figure 31. This chart presents a 
three-month rolling average for total retail sales, retail sales excluding the motor 
trade, and for household equipment. Following strong growth in Q2 of this year, 
overall retail sales decelerated month-on-month in Q3. However, growth rates 
remain strongly positive and as of September 2018 the three-month rolling 
growth rate was 4.6 per cent. As has been the case for the last two years, growth 
of housing equipment sales13 continues to outperform other retail sales (14.2 per 
cent in September 2018). As the economy continues to expand and household 
income continues to increase, retail sales are expected to continue growing into 
2019. 
 
FIGURE 31 AVERAGE GROWTH (%) IN RETAIL SALES INDEX VOLUME ADJUSTED (BASE 2005=100), 
THREE-MONTH ROLLING AVERAGE 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
                                                          
 
13  This includes furniture and lighting; hardware, paints and glass and electrical goods. 
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Figure 32 presents the ESRI/KBC Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) which tracks the 
monthly views of households on their current and future economic perspectives. 
Following three consecutive months in which the CSI fell, the Index in October 
was at 93.5 points, which is the lowest level since December 2014. One of the 
main determinants of this fall has been the negative outlook of consumers on the 
macroeconomy. Given that this has been a period marked by increasing 
uncertainty around the outcome of Brexit and escalations of international trade 
wars, it is unsurprising that consumers’ outlook has been impacted adversely.  
 
FIGURE 32 ESRI/KBC CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS 
 
Source:  ESRI/KBC Consumer Sentiment Index. 
 
In addition to understanding trends in consumer sentiment, further insight into 
Irish households’ appetite for spending and views on economic activity can be 
drawn from their savings behaviour. Figure 33 displays the three-month moving 
average of the ESRI/Bank of Ireland Savings Index, which measures Irish peoples’ 
sentiment towards savings. Overall the Index has been relatively stable in 2018 
with the three-month average dipping slightly in October 2018 to 102.4 points 
from 103.4 points in January.  
 
The two sub-indexes that compose the Savings Index are the Savings Attitudes 
and the Savings Environment. The stability in the overall index hides the fact that 
both these sub-indexes have been moving in opposite directions for much of the 
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year. The three-month rolling average of the Savings Attitudes14 Index rose to a 
new high of 106.6 points in September 2018 before decreasing again slightly to 
106.2 in October. This increase was mainly driven by a heightened satisfaction 
with the amount people were saving. The Savings Environment Index15 on the 
other hand has been decreasing since the start of Q2 2018 as views towards both 
the present and future savings landscape have generally been deteriorating. 
 
FIGURE 33  SAVINGS INDEX AND SUB-INDEXES, THREE-MONTH ROLLING AVERAGE 
 
Source:  ESRI/Bank of Ireland Savings Index. 
 
The overall position of Irish households’ net worth, which is the stock of financial 
and housing assets minus the stock of liabilities, is presented in Figure 34. Irish 
household net worth grew by 10.8 per cent on an annual basis in Q2 2018. This 
increase was primarily driven by increases in housing assets which have grown by 
12.7 per cent year-on-year. Over the same period loan repayments have reduced 
the stock of outstanding liabilities by 3.1 per cent and financial assets have 
increased by 2.7 per cent, raising the total value of domestic balance sheets. 
Household net worth has been rising every quarter since Q1 2013 and now stands 
at its highest ever level of €757 billion. This marks a considerable turnaround for 
the country, given the extent to which household net worth fell following the 
financial crisis. From Q2 2007 to Q1 2013 net worth declined by over €289 billion 
 
                                                          
 
14  The Savings Attitude Index is built on two questions which ask respondents about their saving behaviour and how 
they feel about the amount they save. 
15  The Savings Environment Index is built on two questions which ask whether or not respondents believe that the 
current period is a good time to save and whether or not they believe that in six months’ time it will be a good time 
to save.  
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or 40 per cent. The primary driver of the growth in household net worth since 
then has been the rapid recovery of housing assets. Though they are still off peak 
levels, housing assets have risen by over 80 per cent since the financial crash.  
 
FIGURE 34  IRISH HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH (€ BILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Financial Accounts. 
 
Looking forward, household consumption is set to continue benefitting from 
improving labour market conditions and rising incomes. Providing consumer 
sentiment doesn’t continue to deteriorate due to international instability, 
spending should continue to grow. We expect consumption expenditure to grow 
by 2.6 per cent this year and at a slightly slower pace of 2.3 per cent in 2019.  
 
Property market developments 
Though property price levels continue to increase on an annual basis, the rate of 
price growth has started to slow down considerably in the second half of 2018. 
Figure 35 plots the year-on-year changes in residential property prices.  
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FIGURE 35 ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE INCREASES (%) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
From May 2018 onwards there has been a deceleration in the year-on-year 
growth rate in overall residential property prices. The annual growth rate of 8.6 
per cent in August 2018 marks the first month since April 2017 that the growth 
rate of residential properties has not been in double figures. This slowdown in 
price growth comes on the back of a substantial increase in the housing supply 
over the past year. Figures released by the CSO show there has been an increase 
of over 23 per cent in the number of new dwelling completions in the state 
between Q3 2017 and Q3 2018. Despite this, property price levels are still 
climbing significantly year-on-year and are now just 18.6 per cent below their 
peak level in May 2007. 
 
Taking a closer look at the different types of dwelling, there is a divergence 
emerging between the growth rates of house and apartment prices. Growth rates 
for house prices have decelerated at a greater rate than apartment prices in Q3 
2018. In August 2018, national house price growth was at 8.3 per cent, relative to 
last year, while apartment price growth was at 12.8 per cent. 
 
Property price developments for Dublin and the rest of Ireland are presented in 
Figure 36. Following a sustained period of deceleration of property price growth 
in Dublin since May 2018, the rest of the country has started to mirror the 
slowdown in the capital. With consecutive falls in property price growth in July 
and August, annual growth outside of Dublin fell to 11.4 per cent in August. This 
is down from a three-year high of 15.2 per cent in June. However, this rate of 
price growth remains significantly greater than that in Dublin. As of August 2018, 
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property prices in Dublin were growing year-on-year at 6.1 per cent. This is less 
than half the rate they were growing in April 2018 (13 per cent). The increased 
housing supply in Q3 of this year has been largely focused in the Dublin area with 
40 per cent of new housing completions being located in the capital. This increase 
in supply along with the impact of the macroprudential regulations are likely the 
main reason why the decline in property price growth has been steeper in Dublin 
compared with the rest of the country. 
 
FIGURE 36 RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE GROWTH (%) BY REGION 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Figure 37 presents the relationship between house price growth and house price 
expectations since the beginning of 2016. House price expectations are collected 
from the ESRI House Price Index which, amongst other questions, asks individuals 
about their outlook for house prices 12 months from now. House prices are 
published by the CSO with a two-month lag. From October 2016 onwards there is 
a clear positive correlation between the change in house price expectations and 
the movement of actual house prices. This relationship is most evident from 
March 2018 onwards, where a substantial fall in house price growth coincides 
with a substantial fall in annual house price expectations.  
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FIGURE 37 RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE GROWTH (%) AND CONSUMER HOUSE PRICE GROWTH 
EXPECTATIONS (%)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI survey data.  
 
National level rents increased by 7.6 per cent year-on-year in Q2 2018. This is the 
twenty-fourth consecutive quarter that the annual rent level in the country has 
increased. Upward pressure on rents is likely to continue as the level of housing 
supply fails to meet growing structural demand going forward. The ESRI/RTB 
Rental Index also produces indicators at a regional level, namely for Dublin, the 
Greater Dublin Area (GDA) and outside of the GDA. These indexes are presented 
in Figure 38. Rent levels across all three regions increased in Q2 2018, with Dublin 
in particular seeing a sharp spike over this period of 4.3 per cent. As rents in 
Dublin increase, rents in the GDA are also set to increase as people are priced out 
of the Dublin market and forced to move outside of the capital. Rent levels 
outside of the GDA are also increasing and have surpassed the previous high set 
in Q3 2007. 
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FIGURE 38 RTB RENT INDEX – DUBLIN, GDA (EXCL. DUBLIN) AND OUTSIDE GDA, Q3 2007=100  
 
 
Source:  Residential Tenancies Board (RTB). 
 
Rent levels in both Dublin and the GDA (excluding Dublin) have clearly grown at a 
faster pace than the rest of the country since 2013. This could reflect the faster 
pace of economic growth in the capital. Year-on-year, rents increased by 7.8 per 
cent in Dublin and 6.4 per cent in the GDA (excluding Dublin) in Q1 2018. 
 
More generally, as the macroprudential regulations are likely to impact on the 
demand for homeownership in the capital, this will likely result in additional 
pressures in the rental market. 
 
SUPPLY 
Investment 
Despite the highly volatile nature of overall investment in Ireland, underlying 
modified investment (which excludes transactions for aircraft leasing and 
research and development related intellectual property intangibles), is growing 
strongly. Total investment has fallen since 2016 as the exceptional increase in the 
importation of R&D related intellectual capital assets has declined. Figure 39 
presents the trends in total and modified investment.  
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FIGURE 39  COMPONENTS OF INVESTMENT AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data.  
 
To better understand the investment in capital across the broader economy, it is 
worthwhile to focus on the trend in machinery and equipment investment and 
investment in the construction sector. First, Figure 40 presents the annualised 
quarterly growth rate in investment for modified machinery and equipment. This 
is an important series as it indicates the real capital assets that firms are 
accumulating. While investment in these assets is very volatile, it can be seen that 
the underlying trend growth is still strong, despite some reduction in 2017 and 
2018. 
 
FIGURE 40  YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATE IN MODIFIED M&E INVESTMENT AND UNDERLYING 
TREND  
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data.  
Note: Trend is calculated using a simple univariate Hodrick Prescott Filter with lambda set at 1600.  
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For many companies, especially those in domestic non-traded sectors 
(distribution, agriculture, other business services and construction) transport 
equipment is also likely to be a large component of investment activity. Indeed, 
Gargan et al. (2018)16 note that a higher share of SMEs invest in transport 
equipment relative to other fixed assets. To focus more specifically on 
investments in these type of assets, we present the growth rate in transport 
assets for Ireland. These data are presented by Eurostat for other European 
countries, which also allows us to benchmark Ireland’s activity internationally. 
 
Figure 41 presents the annualised quarterly growth rate in transport equipment 
as well as the underlying trend in the data extracted using a univariate Hodrick 
Prescott filter. Data are presented for Ireland, the EU, and the UK. Focusing on 
the trend growth rate it is notable that in all three jurisdictions, there has been a 
recent decline in investment in transport assets. Indeed the reduction observed 
in the UK is probably influenced by the Brexit referendum and is likely due to 
increased business uncertainties in the UK market. Likewise, the decline in the 
trend is noteworthy in Ireland. This may be indicative of heightened uncertainties 
around the trading environment given Brexit and other developments and is 
suggestive of a more muted increase in domestic non-construction capital 
formation. 
 
 
                                                          
 
16  Gargan, E., M. Lawless, M. Martinez-Cillero and C. O’Toole, 2018. ‘Exploring SME investment patterns in Ireland: New 
survey evidence’, Quarterly Economic Commentary Autumn 2018, The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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FIGURE 41 ANNUALISED QUARTERLY GROWTH IN TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT AND 
UNDERLYING TRENDS 
 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat and QEC calculations.  
 
Turning now to investment in construction, we expect this to continue increasing 
significantly in 2018 as output of residential dwellings, in particular, rises sharply. 
Data for housing completions for the period Q1 2011 to Q3 2018 are presented 
Figure 42. The rising trend, evident for the past number of quarters, has 
continued into the present period. Of note is that most of the increase in the 
number of units is due to multi-dwelling housing schemes which now account for 
approximately 60 per cent of new completions. 
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FIGURE 42 ANNUAL HOUSING COMPLETIONS (2017-2018 FORECASTS) – TO 2016 ACTUAL 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
To contextualise the rapid investment in construction in a broader European 
context, Figure 43 presents the annualised trend in quarterly Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation in dwellings in Ireland relative to the EU average and the UK. The rapid 
growth in Ireland is nearly double the rate in the two other jurisdictions. The 
trend in both the UK and the EU has been falling somewhat in the most recent 
quarters, which is opposite to the Irish data. While McQuinn (2018), in a Research 
Note accompanying this Commentary points to the fact that Ireland’s economy 
has capacity to deal with additional construction activity, the rapid growth in this 
activity must be monitored closely to ensure imbalances in production or credit 
markets do not arise. Over time, it would be welcome if housing policy could 
remove a proportion of the pro-cyclical volatility in construction investment in 
Ireland which should help mitigate macroeconomic or financial stability risks.  
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FIGURE 43 GROWTH IN DWELLINGS INVESTMENT – IRELAND IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
 
In terms of our outlook for construction investment, we expect that building 
investment will continue to increase particularly as the rate of housing 
construction expands. Using the increase in housing completions for the first two 
quarters of 2018 relative to the first two quarters of 2017, we forecast 18,500 
units in 2018 increasing to 23,400 units in 2019 (Figure 44). 
 
FIGURE 44 ANNUAL HOUSING COMPLETIONS (2018-2019 FORECASTS) – TO 2017 ACTUAL 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and QEC Forecasts. 
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Consequently, despite the international uncertainties, we maintain an optimistic 
position for overall investment in 2018 and 2019, driven in the main by the 
construction sector. In particular, we expect annual average growth in investment 
of 6.3 per cent in 2018 and 9.8 per cent in 2019. 
 
LABOUR MARKET 
The Irish labour market continues to perform strongly in Q3 2018, with 
employment levels reaching record highs and earnings experiencing growth. 
While these developments may give rise to concerns about overheating of the 
economy, inflation remains low and the overall growth in wages has been 
moderate. There remains a sizeable gap in unemployment between individuals 
with different levels of education, with those who have lower levels of education 
also having higher rates of unemployment. This suggests that there is some room 
to expand the labour force further over the medium term.  
 
Unemployment 
While the Live Register is not a precise measure of unemployment,17 as it includes 
part-time and some seasonal and casual workers, it is one of the most up-to-date 
and detailed labour market measures. The most recent release of Live Register 
data shows that unemployment has continued to fall in Q3 2018.  
 
Since January of this year, the seasonally-adjusted Live Register recorded a 
decrease of 27,400 (-11.51 per cent) in October 2018, resulting in a seasonally-
adjusted total of 210,700 people on the Register. Between January and October 
of 2018, the total number of people under the age of 25 on the Live Register 
declined by 4,200 individuals (-15.9 per cent). The same period last year saw a 
4,400 (-13.6 per cent) decline in persons under 25 on the Live Register. The 
number of people above 25 years on the Live Register in October 2018 was 
188,500, which was down 11 per cent on the level in January 2018.  
 
 
                                                          
 
17  The Live Register provides a monthly series of the numbers of people registered for Jobseekers Benefit, Jobseekers 
Allowance or other statutory entitlements at the Irish Department of Social Protection. 
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FIGURE 45 NUMBERS ON THE LIVE REGISTER (‘000) BY AGE: OCTOBER 2006 TO OCTOBER 2018 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Since 201218 the Live Register has published detailed data on the duration of the 
registrations, which can be used has a proxy for short- and long-term 
unemployment. Long-term unemployment is defined as being out of work for a 
period of greater than 12 months and its negative consequences for individuals 
and society have been well documented.19 The longer a person is unemployed, 
the more difficult re-entry into employment is likely to be. Factors such as 
deskilling, hysteresis and apprehension from employers about hiring someone 
who has been out of work for a sustained period of time are all unique obstacles 
for those experiencing long-term unemployment. 
 
In October 2015, 150,000 people were classified as long-term unemployed which 
represented 46.6 per cent of those on the Live Register. This figure has fallen 
dramatically over the last three years and, as of October 2018, there were 83,000 
people in long-term unemployment (41.7 per cent of the total). Table 4 displays 
the difference in long-term unemployment between men and women. In October 
2015, over 50 per cent of men on the Live Register were classified as being long-
term unemployed in comparison to 41.4 per cent of women. This difference can 
largely be explained by the collapse of the construction sector following the 
financial crisis. The collapse of the sector accounted for a significant increase in 
the number of men in long-term unemployment, while the impact on women, 
who make up only a small fraction of construction related workers, was 
 
                                                          
 
18  With occasional breaks in the data. 
19  Abraham, C., K., Sandusky, J., Haltiwanger and J. R., Spletzer (2016). ‘The Consequences of Long Term 
Unemployment: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data’, Working Papers 16-40, Center for Economic 
Studies, U.S. Census Bureau. 
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negligible. As the performance of the economy has improved and the 
construction sector has recovered, the long run employment gap has narrowed 
significantly with 43.7 per cent of men and 39 per cent of women in long-term 
unemployment as of October 2018.  
 
TABLE 4  PERSONS (‘000) ON THE LIVE REGISTER CLASSIFIED BY DURATION 
Gender Duration 2015 M10 2018 M10 
  
(‘000) % (‘000) % 
Total 
All Durations 321 
 
199 
 
Under 1 year 171 53.4 116 58.3 
1-2 years 38 11.9 22 11.2 
2-3 years 26 8.2 13 6.5 
3 years and over 85 26.6 48 24.0 
Male 
All Durations 190 
 
112 
 
Under 1 year 94 49.7 63 56.3 
1-2 years 22 11.7 13 11.6 
2-3 years 15 7.8 7 6.6 
3 years and over 58 30.8 29 25.5 
Female 
All Durations 131 
 
87 
 
Under 1 year 77 58.6 53 61.0 
1-2 years 16 12.2 9 10.7 
2-3 years 11 8.7 6 6.3 
3 years and over 27 20.6 19 22.0 
 
Source:  Live Register, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Table 5 summarises the number of people on the Live Register by the last 
occupation held between October 2017 and 2018. The number of people on the 
Live Register has fallen across all occupational groups over the last year. Craft and 
related services represents the largest share of registered individuals, though this 
group also saw the largest year-on-year decrease (-19.42 per cent) in people out 
of work.  
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TABLE 5  NUMBERS AND PROPORTIONS ON THE LIVE REGISTER (‘000) BY LAST OCCUPATION 
Sector 2017 M10 2018 M10 % Change 
All broad occupational groups 236.5 199.2 -15.8% 
Managers and administrators 11.4 10.3 -9.7% 
Professional 14.3 12.4 -13.3% 
Associate professional and technical 7.7 6.9 -10.4% 
Clerical and secretarial 24.6 21.6 -12.2% 
Craft and related 41.7 33.6 -19.4% 
Personal and protective services 30.7 25.9 -15.6% 
Sales 24.9 20.5 -17.7% 
Plant and machine operatives 36.8 30.7 -16.6% 
Other broad occupational groups 29.4 24.7 -16.0% 
No occupation 15.0 12.5 -16.7% 
 
Sources:  Live Register, Central Statistics Office. 
 
In October 2018 the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate fell to 5.3 per cent. 
This is the lowest level of unemployment recorded since the first quarter of 2008. 
 
FIGURE 46 SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY MONTH (%) 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
 
 
Employment 
The seasonally-adjusted figures for employment in the Irish economy continue to 
increase with 66,700 jobs being added relative to the same period last year (3 per 
cent), bringing the number of persons in employment to 2,237,200. The largest 
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year-on-year growth rates were recorded in the construction sector (14.1 per 
cent), administrative and support service sector (13.7 per cent) and 
accommodation and food services (10.1 per cent). Elsewhere, agricultural 
employment decreased by 5.4 per cent for the same period, falling by 8.8 per 
cent since the outcome of the Brexit referendum. As Lawless and Studnicka 
(2017) highlight, this sector bears a considerably higher share of exposure to 
potential Brexit fallouts and hence may continue to experience disproportionally 
larger shares of job loss in the future as well.20 
 
After a period of continued growth, employment in the Irish economy has now 
surpassed its previous 2007 peak level (2,228,700) and more workers are moving 
from part-time to full-time employment. In Q3 2018, full-time (non-seasonally-
adjusted) employment increased by 44,200 (2.5 per cent) year-on-year to 
1,812,900. Full-time employment now accounts for 79.8 per cent of total 
employment, this compares with 81.3 per cent in the 2007 peak and 74.8 per 
cent in the 2012 downturn. Part-time employment increased by 22,500 (5.1 per 
cent) to 460,300 and accounts for 20.2 per cent of total employment. Overall 
employment rates (69.1 per cent) are still below 2007 levels (71.8 per cent) but 
above those in the early 2000s (64.5 per cent). 
 
FIGURE 47 SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED PARTICIPATION RATES BY GENDER, 15 YEARS AND OVER (%) 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
 
 
                                                          
 
20  Lawless, M. and Z. Studnicka (2017). ‘Potential Impacts of WTO Tariffs on Cross-Border Trade’, Brexit Research 
Report, InterTradeIreland. Available at: https://intertradeireland.com/brexit/brexit-research. 
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Figure 47 displays the seasonally-adjusted labour force participation rates by 
gender since the turn of the millennium. Overall, the participation rate has failed 
to recover from the financial crash, with participation rates in Q3 2018 4.5 per 
cent below their peak level of 66.7 per cent in 2007. The gender gap in 
participation has also fallen over this period due to the different trends in male 
and female participation rates from their peak levels. The participation rate for 
men has stagnated following the crash and remains 8.4 per cent below its peak 
rate of 76.8 per cent. In contrast, the female participation rate fell by just 2.7 per 
cent from the pre-crash high of 57.2 per cent and was back at 56.1 per cent in Q3 
2018. 
 
TABLE 6 EMPLOYMENT RATES (15-64 YEARS) BY EDUCATION (%) 
 Education Level  Age Group Ireland EU 
All Education levels 
Total (15-64 years) 68.5 68.6 
From 15 to 24 years 40.1 35.1 
From 25 to 54 years 79.1 80.6 
From 55 to 64 years 60.5 58.6 
Lower secondary or below 
Total (15-64 years) 36.8 46.1 
From 15 to 24 years 10.1 18.9 
From 25 to 54 years 54.8 63.5 
From 55 to 64 years 49.9 43.9 
Upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary 
Total (15-64 years) 69.3 72.0 
From 15 to 24 years 57.0 47.8 
From 25 to 54 years 75.8 82.0 
From 55 to 64 years 61.9 60.2 
Tertiary 
Total (15-64 years) 84.9 84.7 
From 15 to 24 years 78.2 63.1 
From 25 to 54 years 87.8 88.6 
From 55 to 64 years 70.3 73.7 
 
Sources:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office, Eurostat. 
 
Overall employment rates in Ireland are almost exactly in line with the average 
among European Union countries. Employment rates among the young (15-24 
years) and the older generation (55-64 years) are higher in Ireland than in the EU 
average, although prime age workers (25-54 years) face lower employment rates. 
One major cause of concern is the rate of employment amongst those with lower 
levels of education, which is significantly less than the EU average. Amongst those 
with lower secondary education or below there is an employment rate of just 
36.8 per cent in Ireland in comparison with 46.1 per cent in the EU. This 
discrepancy is highest amongst the young, with 10.1 per cent of 15-24-year-olds 
with lower secondary education in employment, in comparison with 18.9 per cent 
in the EU. These differences are reversed when it comes to young people with 
tertiary education. In Ireland 78.2 per cent of those aged 15-24 with tertiary 
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education are employed compared to 63.1 per cent in the EU. These prominent 
disparities in the employment rates among individuals with different educational 
levels may be suggestive of a skills mismatch in the Irish economy.21  
 
Earnings 
In Q3 2018, seasonally-adjusted Average Hourly Earnings increased by 2.6 per 
cent to €23.05 per hour relative to the same period last year. The largest increase 
for the quarter was observed in information and communication activities, rising 
annually by 4.6 per cent (an additional €1.41 per hour). Notably high growth 
occurred in transport and storage (+5.6 per cent) and administrative services 
(+4.8 per cent). Figure 48 highlights earnings persistently trending upwards since 
the end of 2015. As of Q3 2018, average weekly earnings reached €742.41, 
representing a 2.8 per cent increase from €722.09 in Q2 2017. An annual increase 
both in hourly earnings and paid hours resulted in a 5.5 per cent rise in average 
weekly earnings in the construction sector.  
 
FIGURE 48  TRENDS IN AVERAGE EARNINGS PER WEEK AND PER HOUR (€), SEASONALLY-
ADJUSTED 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  The Y-axis on the LHS scale has a very low range of values.  
 
Distinguishing between public and private pay, the public sector experienced an 
annual increase of 2.3 per cent to €961.39 per week while private sector 
employees saw an annual increase of 3.4 per cent to €688.99 per week. For the 
 
                                                          
 
21  See McGuinness, S., P. Konstantinos and P. Redmond (2017). ‘Skills Mismatch: Concepts, Measurement and Policy 
Approaches’, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 32 (4), pp. 985-1015. 
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public sector, average weekly earnings ranged from €827.67 among regional 
bodies to €1,325.13 per week for An Garda Síochána in Q3 2018. Average private 
sector earnings ranged from €354.48 per week in accommodation and food 
service activities to €1,168.10 per week in ICT activities. Irregular earnings and 
bonuses, which are those that are not paid regularly at each pay period, are 
displayed in Figure 49.  
 
FIGURE 49 WEEKLY BONUS EARNINGS, FOUR-QUARTER ROLLING AVERAGE (€) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Labour market forecasts 
As the Irish economy approaches full employment, earnings growth has 
increased. With economic activity forecast to be growing at a lower, more stable 
rate over the next two years, the unemployment rate is expected to average 5.7 
per cent through 2018 and 5.1 per cent in 2019. Employment is set to exceed 
2.26 million by the end of 2018, increasing to 2.33 million by the end of 2019. 
While inflows of migrant workers should help maintain competitiveness in the 
domestic market, the upward trend in the vacancy rate suggests labour supply 
has thus far been persistently outstripped by demand. As a result, nominal 
earnings are expected to continue to rise, increasing by 2.6 per cent in 2018, and 
2.9 per cent in 2019.  
 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
Annual taxation receipts for the year to October have grown significantly at 
almost 7 per cent. This follows 6 per cent growth in 2017 and an increase of 
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almost 5 per cent in 2016. Figure 50 illustrates the annual changes in taxation 
returns for the last three years for the main tax categories as well as the overall 
total amount. 
 
FIGURE 50 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS (%)  
 
Source:  Department of Finance and QEC calculations. 
 
While we discuss the relatively large increases in corporation taxes later in the 
section, the strong increase in both income taxes and pay related social insurance 
does indicate the robust expansion of underlying economic activity. For the year 
to date, the latter item is growing at almost 5 per cent per annum, while income 
taxation receipts are up 6.5 per cent relative to 2017. This, allied to the 
continuing decline in the unemployment rate, denotes the strength of domestic 
economic performance.  
 
Budget 2019 saw a significant increase in Government expenditure forecast for 
the short- to medium-term. Table 7 documents actual and forecast changes in 
gross voted current and capital expenditure between 2016 and 2020. 
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TABLE 7  ACTUAL AND FORECAST ANNUAL CHANGES (%) IN GROSS VOTED GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE: 2016-2020 
Year Current  Capital Total 
2016  4.2 9.6 4.6 
2017 5.1 8.2 5.3 
2018 5.5 30.2 7.4 
2019 4.1 23.5 6.0 
2020 2.4 10.3 3.3 
 
Source:  Department of Finance and QEC calculations. 
 
In 2018 and 2019 capital expenditure in particular is expected to increase 
substantially. This does reflect a response to the period of significant under-
investment in areas such as housing in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
However, it is important that the Government does not cause the domestic 
economy to overheat given this increased expenditure and that the increase is 
based on sustainable increases in Government revenues.  
 
As noted earlier, a major reason for the strong increase in recent taxation 
receipts is the relatively large surge in corporation taxation particularly for the 
month of October itself. For the period to October, this means that corporation 
tax receipts are now growing at over 20 per cent per annum. This follows an 
increase of almost 13 per cent for the same period last year. In Figure 51, annual 
corporation tax receipts for the period 2000 to the present are plotted.22 
 
FIGURE 51 ANNUAL CORPORATION TAXATION RECEIPTS: 2000-2018 (€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Department of Finance and QEC calculations. 
 
                                                          
 
22  Note the 2018 figure is obtained by applying the January-October growth rate to the 2017 figure. 
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
58 |  Quar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  Wi nt er  20 18   
 
 
It can be seen that post-2006, corporation tax receipts fell quite significantly and 
only started to increase from 2012 onwards. Therefore, some of the recent 
increase in this category does appear to be taxation receipts coming back to a 
long-run trend level. However, corporate tax returns over the past few years have 
experienced a particularly significant increase. The concern that some of these 
increases are ‘windfall’ in nature is compounded by the presence in the National 
Accounts of large distortionary transactions, which are due to the activities of 
certain multinational firms. 
 
The sustainability of this increase is a concern from a budgetary perspective. As 
noted in Addison-Smyth and McQuinn (2016, 2010),23 much of the difficulties 
experienced with the Irish fiscal accounts post the financial crisis were due to the 
windfall nature of taxation receipts associated with the housing market in the 
lead up to 2008. Therefore, it is crucial that policymakers do not seek to fund 
future current expenditure on the back of potential windfall receipts in 
corporation taxes. 
 
While corporation taxation receipts are expected to increase by over 20 per cent 
in 2018, as a sensitivity exercise we take an alternative rate of increase and 
examine the implications for the Government General Balance. In particular, we 
assume that corporation taxes increase by 9 per cent in 2018.24 The results for 
both scenarios are compared in Table 8. 
 
TABLE 8  IMPLICATIONS FOR GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCE (GGB) OF DIFFERENT 
CORPORATION TAX LEVELS: 2018-2019 
Scenario 2018 2019 
Baseline   
GGB -0.2 -0.3 
Growth Rate Corporation Tax (%) 21.7 2.0 
Counterfactual    
GGB -0.4 -0.5 
Growth Rate Corporation Tax (%) 9.0 2.0 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
 
                                                          
 
23  Addison-Smyth D. and K. McQuinn (2010). ‘Quantifying revenue windfalls from the Irish housing market’, The 
Economic and Social Review, Vol. 41(2), pp.201-223. 
Addison-Smyth D. and K. McQuinn (2016). ‘Assessing the sustainable nature of housing-related taxation receipts: The 
case of Ireland’, Journal of European Real Estate Research, First published online, June. 
24  On average, corporation tax receipts have increased by 9 per cent per annum between 1998 and 2018. 
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The counterfactual exercise demonstrates the GGB would have been 0.2 
percentage points worse off for both this year and next year if corporation taxes 
had grown at a long-term average growth rate of 9 per cent for the present year. 
 
Figure 52 presents the debt-to-output ratio for both GDP and the new GNI* 
measure. While both trends indicate that Ireland’s debt sustainability is clearly 
improving, a significant difference is evident between the GDP and GNI* output 
denominators. 
 
FIGURE 52 DEBT-TO-GDP AND GNI*RATIOS (%) 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
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General Assessment 
 
2018 saw the Irish economy register another robust year of activity. While the 
transactions of a small number of multinationals inflate the headline growth 
figure, underlying economic activity still increased between 4.5 and 5 per cent in 
the current year. The period since 2013 has seen a truly remarkable recovery by 
the Irish economy. Furthermore, it appears that the growth profile in 2018 was a 
broadly balanced one with both domestic and external sources of growth 
contributing to the overall performance.  
 
While the outlook for 2019 is also positive, serious risks and challenges will arise 
in the coming year; most of these are international in nature. The outcome of the 
Brexit process will have a significant impact on the domestic economy; both for 
the immediate forecast range but also, obviously, more profoundly over the 
medium to longer term. In the Output section of the Commentary, the 
implications for the short-term forecast of Brexit are outlined. In particular the 
results of the modelling work in Bergin et al. (2017),25 which examine the 
implications of the different Brexit outcomes over the longer term on the Irish 
economy are mapped through to the short-term forecasts. These results suggest 
that, depending on the outcome, the growth rate for the Irish economy in 2019 
could be reduced by up to 1.5 percentage points depending on the nature of the 
exit process.  
 
Notwithstanding the risks to the outlook, the persistence of recent growth does 
give rise to the possibility of capacity constraints impeding future activity. In a 
Research Note to the Commentary, McQuinn (2018) examines this issue 
specifically in the context of future housing supply. In particular the capacity of 
the Irish labour market and financial sector to accommodate a sustained increase 
in housing output is assessed. The Note suggests that while both employment 
and credit levels in construction are still quite low by historical standards, any 
sizeable increase in activity will see a significant expansion in the size of the 
domestic financial sector. Furthermore, given the low rate of unemployment at 
present, the domestic economy will require a sustained increase in net inward 
migration to provide the requisite labour. This will pose a certain timing challenge 
in the sense that while increased inward migration will be necessary to meet the 
residential construction targets outlined in Rebuilding Ireland, these additional 
 
                                                          
 
25  Bergin A., A. Rodriguez, E. Morgenroth and D. Smith (2017). ‘Modelling the medium-to long-term potential 
macroeconomic impact of Brexit on the Irish economy’, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, Autumn 
2017, pp.305-316. 
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workers will inevitably increase the level of structural demand for housing in the 
economy. Also, as outlined in Duffy et al. (2016)26 there are now certain 
regulatory challenges confronting the Irish financial sector in funding a sizeable 
increase in its balance sheet. 
 
Budget 2019 was a significantly expansionary fiscal package with both current 
and capital expenditure set to increase in a marked fashion relative to 2018. 
While the increased expenditure on items to do with social housing are welcome, 
overall the package does increase the possibility of overheating in the domestic 
economy. Furthermore, while a surplus in the General Government Balance 
(GGB) had looked a possibility in 2019 prior to the Budget, the subsequent 
increase in expenditure announced does now mean that a deficit is likely in 2019. 
The drift in current spending in areas such as health is particularly worrisome. 
Given the sustained rate of expansion in domestic activity, it is incumbent on 
policymakers to start accumulating fiscal buffers to help offset the impact of the 
next sizeable shock on the economy. A further note of caution in relation to the 
public finances is the substantial nature of the corporation tax take in 2018. In 
the year to October these receipts are up over 20 per cent on the similar period 
in the previous year, which themselves had increased by 13 per cent on 2016 
levels. It is very difficult to assess how much of this increase reflects sustainable 
improvements in the financial performance of multinationals operating in the 
Irish jurisdiction and how much is related to certain exceptional transactions. 
Either way, as noted in Addison-Smyth and McQuinn (2010; 2016),27 it is 
imperative to heed the lessons of the past and not to base future increases in 
expenditure on the basis of one-off or windfall receipts in taxation.  
 
In another Special Article to this Commentary, Keane et al. (2018) examine the 
budgetary package from a distributional perspective. Their analysis suggests that 
by comparing budget measures to what would have happened if tax and benefit 
thresholds rose in line with forecasted average wage and price growth, the 
Budget’s tax and benefit changes generally kept pace with prices, but were not 
large enough to keep pace with wage growth. In particular, the analysis suggests 
that relative to a neutral benchmark, where all thresholds, duties and benefit 
payments rose in line with forecast wage growth, the Budget resulted in 
households’ disposable income being 0.66 per cent less than the benchmark 
level. The difference between the benchmark level and actual incomes range 
 
                                                          
 
26  Duffy D., D. Foley, K. McQuinn and N. McInerney (2016). ‘Demographic change, long-run housing demand and the 
related challenges for the Irish banking sector’, in Ireland’s Economic Outlook. The Economic and Social Research 
Institute, December, 2016. 
27  Addison-Smyth D. and K. McQuinn (2010). ‘Quantifying revenue windfalls from the Irish housing market’, The 
Economic and Social Review, Vol. 41(2), pp.201-223. 
Addison-Smyth D. and K. McQuinn (2016). ‘Assessing the sustainable nature of housing-related taxation receipts: The 
case of Ireland’, Journal of European Real Estate Research, First published online, June. 
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from -0.9 per cent for the lowest income group to -0.4 per cent for the highest 
income group. Keane et al. (2018) also discuss broader fiscal challenges. In 
particular, they note the highly concentrated nature of corporation tax receipts, 
the need for more stable sources of taxation revenue such as that provided by 
carbon taxes and the need for more comprehensive forecasts of future 
expenditure levels by Government departments.  
 
 
 
 
  
DETAILED FORECAST TABLES 
 
 
 
  
FORECAST TABLE A1 EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 193.0 -0.2 1.8 192.6 11.6 12.2 215.0 4.3 3.3 224.3 
Tourism 4.7 6.1 4.8 5.0 3.0 3.0 5.1 3.2 3.2 5.3 
Other Services 130.4 18.7 16.6 154.7 5.7 5.0 163.6 8.7 7.8 177.8 
Exports of Goods and Services 328.2 7.4 7.8 352.6 8.9 8.7 384.0 6.2 5.2 407.7 
FISM Adjustment 0.0     0.0     -0.5     -0.5 
Adjusted Exports 328.2 7.4 7.8 352.6 8.8 8.7 383.5 6.2 5.2 407.2 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 INVESTMENT 
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 4.2 28.5 22.6 5.4 27.6 22.5 6.9 21.7 24.2 8.4 
Other Building 11.3 26.2 18.8 14.3 15.0 9.0 16.4 17.1 11.0 19.2 
Transfer Costs 1.1 4.4 -4.2 1.2 9.2 3.0 1.3 9.2 3.0 1.4 
Building and Construction 17.7 23.0 16.0 21.8 17.7 11.9 25.6 17.9 14.2 30.2 
Machinery and Equipment 79.9 -40.9 -41.4 47.2 -12.5 -14.4 41.3 9.6 7.3 45.3 
Total Investment 97.6 -29.3 -31.0 69.0 -3.0 -6.3 67.0 12.9 9.8 75.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
FORECAST TABLE A3 PERSONAL INCOME 
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture 0.7 2.7 0.0 0.7 2.5 0.0 0.7 1.4 0.0 0.7 
Non-Agricultural 81.8 4.7 3.9 85.7 5.9 5.0 90.7 6.4 5.8 96.6 
Rental Income 9.4 7.2 0.7 10.0 7.6 0.8 10.8 7.4 0.8 11.6 
Other Income 13.5 16.3 2.2 15.7 7.9 1.2 17.0 4.7 0.8 17.8 
Total Income Received 105.4 6.4 6.8 112.1 6.3 7.1 119.2 6.2 7.4 126.6 
Current Transfers 9.1 -5.4 -0.5 8.6 -6.6 -0.6 8.0 -8.8 -0.7 7.3 
Gross Personal Income 114.4 5.5 6.3 120.7 5.4 6.5 127.2 5.3 6.7 134.0 
Taxes on Income and Wealth -21.2 4.3 -0.9 -22.2 7.8 -1.7 -23.9 4.7 -1.1 -25.0 
Personal Disposable Income 93.2 5.8 5.4 98.6 4.8 4.8 103.3 5.4 5.6 109.0 
Consumption 91.2 2.9 2.6 93.8 4.0 3.8 97.6 3.9 3.8 101.4 
Personal Savings 8.1 40.6 3.3 11.4 13.6 1.5 13.0 18.2 2.4 15.3 
Savings Ratio 8.3   11.2   12.0   13.4 
Average Personal Tax Rate 0.19   0.18   0.19   0.19 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES  
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 87.0 -2.2 -5.5 85.2 7.0 7.6 91.1 8.3 7.2 98.7 
Tourism 5.6 3.4 2.4 5.8 4.7 3.2 6.1 5.4 3.8 6.4 
Other Services 193.2 -10.8 -11.7 172.2 0.1 -1.0 172.4 7.3 5.9 184.9 
Imports of Goods and Services 285.9 -7.9 -9.4 263.3 2.4 1.7 269.6 7.6 6.3 290.0 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0   -0.5   -0.6 
Adjusted Imports 285.9 -7.9 -9.4 263.3 2.2 1.7 269.1 7.6 6.3 289.4 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 328.2 352.6 383.5 407.2 
Imports of Goods and Services 285.9 263.3 269.1 289.4 
Net Factor Payments -49.9 -59.8 -70.8 -75.7 
Net Transfers -3.8 -4.6 -5.1 -5.7 
Balance on Current Account -11.4 24.9 38.4 36.3 
As a % of GNP -5.1 10.7 15.2 13.6 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL AVERAGE 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
 
‘000 ‘000 ‘000 ‘000 
Agriculture 112.3 110.4 107.2 105.0 
Industry 394.2 412.0 425.2 438.4 
Of which: Construction 118.6 128.8 144.4 150.7 
Services 1,618.7 1,664.3 1,725.8 1,778.9 
Total at Work 2,132.3 2,194.2 2,257.9 2,330.6 
Unemployed 194.9 157.9 141.6 117.6 
Labour Force 2,327.1 2,352.0 2,399.5 2,448.2 
Unemployment Rate, % 8.4 6.7 5.7 5.1 
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CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS IN THE IRISH ECONOMY? A PARTIAL 
EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH 
 
* Kieran McQuinn1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Given the consistently high growth rates experienced by the Irish economy since 
2013, an inevitable policy question is whether the economy will face capacity 
constraints in the short to medium-term. By capacity constraints we mean 
capital, labour or financial constraints which may prevent the economy from 
reaching its potential level of output and from growing on a sustainable basis.  
 
Typically, one way to assess capacity constraints from a macroeconomic 
perspective is to estimate an ‘output gap’ and to assess, as a result, whether 
actual output levels in the economy are above or below the potential level. While 
estimates of the output gap in an Irish context are problematic in general due to 
the small open nature of the domestic economy, they are particularly difficult at 
present due to the well-cited issues with the National Accounts.2 As a result, in 
this Note, we take a partial approach to the question by addressing a variety of 
different issues to do with the labour market, net migration and the total amount 
and allocation of credit in the economy.  
 
In assessing the potential presence of capacity constraints, we pay particular 
attention to the property market and the financial sector for two reasons: 
It was the confluence of financial sector and fiscal policy issues which led to the 
significant difficulties experienced in the Irish economy in the period after 
2007/2008; 
A significant increase in housing related activity is likely in the domestic economy 
in the coming years both from private and public sector sources.  
 
In evaluating the presence of capacity constraints, we adopt two approaches; 
first, we examine the historical trends in the particular indicator/variable and 
secondly, where possible, we conduct a cross-country comparison. Both 
 
                                                          
 
1  Thanks to Alan Barrett and Conor O’Toole, both ESRI, for comments on a previous draft. All remaining errors are the 
author’s. 
2  For a discussion of this, see Casey (2018). 
* Kieran.McQuinn@esri.ie ESRI Research Notes 2018/4/1 
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approaches help provide an indication as to whether present activity levels are 
sustainable or not with implications then for future developments.  
1. LABOUR MARKET AND MIGRATION 
In Figure 1, we examine the level of employment in the construction sector in the 
country and compare this with the level of housing supply. The data are 
compared over the period 1998-2018. 
 
FIGURE 1 HOUSING SUPPLY AND EMPLOYMENT IN CONSTRUCTION (‘000) 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and QEC calculations. 
 
From the chart, a clear relationship can be observed between actual housing 
supply and the total numbers in construction related activity. At present, the 
numbers in construction are still somewhat below the heights witnessed back in 
2007 and 2008. However, what is also clear is that given the present low level of 
housing supply vis-à-vis previous levels, the numbers in construction employment 
are actually high on a relative basis. Therefore, if housing construction is to 
increase in future, in the absence of significant efficiencies in the sector, 
employment would have to increase quite substantially. Figure 2 plots the share 
of total employment in construction over the same period. 
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FIGURE 2 SHARE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN CONSTRUCTION (%)  
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and QEC calculations. 
 
From the chart, it is apparent that construction level employment as a 
percentage of the total is at rates observed back in the mid-1990s. As a cross-
country comparison, in Table 1, the relevant share of construction sector 
employment in 2017 for a select number of European countries is listed. 
 
TABLE 1  CONSTRUCTION AS A SHARE (%) OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN 2017 FOR SELECT 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
Country %  
European Union 6.7 
Euro Area 6.4 
Germany 6.8 
Ireland 5.9 
France 6.5 
Spain 6.0 
Netherlands 4.8 
Austria 8.0 
Poland 7.5 
Portugal 6.5 
United Kingdom 7.3 
 
Sources: Newcronos and QEC calculations. 
 
The cross-country data reveal that Ireland’s share of construction employment is 
one of the lowest observed across European countries. However, as is evident 
from Figure 2, the numbers working in construction can increase quite 
significantly on a year-on-year basis with the share increasing accordingly. 
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Given the highly open nature of the domestic economy, movements in the Irish 
labour market tend to be quite volatile with large fluctuations in migration trends 
frequently evident. Inward migration is a potentially important source of labour 
in an Irish context and can help to reduce upward wage inflation in key sectors of 
the domestic labour market. We examine labour market developments again in 
the context of activity in the housing market. In Figure 3, the level of housing 
supply and the unemployment rate are plotted over the period 1998-2018. 
 
FIGURE 3 HOUSING SUPPLY (‘000) AND THE IRISH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (%)  
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and QEC calculations. 
 
The graph illustrates the inverse relationship between unemployment and 
housing construction in the Irish market. Overall, high levels of housing supply are 
synonymous with low rates of unemployment and vice versa. However, at 
present, housing supply levels are quite low, relative to historical levels, while the 
unemployment rate is also quite low at 5.3 per cent. This does suggest that if 
housing construction rates are set to increase, net inward migration will be an 
important source of labour. In Figure 4, housing supply and net inward migration 
levels are plotted. 
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FIGURE 4 HOUSING SUPPLY AND NET INWARD MIGRATION (‘000)  
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and QEC calculations. 
 
Again, as with the total employment in construction series, there is a close 
relationship between net migration into the Irish State and housing supply levels. 
However, like the employment series in Figure 1, it is evident that net migration 
has already picked up in the absence of a significant increase in housing supply. 
This suggests that if a sustained increase in housing supply levels is to be 
achieved, then net migration will have to increase quite significantly in the future. 
In terms of the recent increase in inward migration, Table 2 outlines the country 
of origin of people coming into Ireland. 
 
TABLE 2  ESTIMATED MIGRATION (‘000) INTO IRELAND BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
Year 
EU28 
(excluding UK) 
United States Australia Canada 
Other 
Countries 
2013 -1.2 -8.1 -1.7 -3.0 3.5 
2014 -0.4 -3.8 -1.9 -2.1 2.6 
2015 4.6 -0.7 -0.7 -3.9 6.9 
2016 3.6 1.6 -0.4 -0.3 8.0 
2017 4.7 1.8 -1.1 -0.5 8.2 
2018 7.1 2.7 1.5 -1.4 15.5 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office. 
 
Therefore, most of the recent increase in inward migration has come from 
Europe and ‘Other Countries’. Recent data from the Census indicate that the 
largest increase in foreign nationals between 2011 and 2016 living in Ireland was 
for the Italian, Romanian, Spanish, African and Brazilian nationalities. 
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Two issues which may arise with future inward migration are existing pressures in 
the rental market and Brexit. Ironically, the significant increases in rental levels 
observed of late in the Irish residential market, particularly in Dublin, may act as a 
disincentive to future inward migration flows. Therefore, the existing high cost of 
accommodation may prevent the workers we require to address the housing 
supply shortage from actually coming to live and work here. The effects of Brexit 
are more ambiguous; greater frictions between the Irish and UK labour markets 
may prevent the relatively free movement of labour between both jusrisdictions, 
however the prospect and the eventual outcome of Brexit may make the UK a 
less desirable destination for inward migration from the rest of Europe. This may 
increase the relative attractiveness of Ireland, ceterus paribus, as a potential 
destination. 
2. CREDIT AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Having examined the labour market implications of future housing related 
construction activity in this section we focus on financial sector issues and the 
allocation of credit. The linkages between the housing market, the financial 
sector and fiscal policy were at the core of Ireland’s difficulties in the run-up to 
the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and were, in the main, the reason for the country 
seeking a programme of support with the European Commission (EC), the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
(commonly referred to as the ‘Troika’), in November 2010. 
 
In Figure 5 the ratio of total credit issued to Irish resident private sector 
enterprises as a percentage of adjusted Gross National Income (commonly known 
as GNI*) is plotted. Expressing the total amount of credit issued as a percentage 
of output is a commonly used measure of financial deepening in an economy (see 
O’Brien et al., 2018, for details). Similar to the Central Bank of Ireland, we use 
GNI* as the relevant output denominator given the well cited difficulties with 
GDP in an Irish context. We use two different measures of credit; one that 
includes credit issued to the financial sector and one that does not. This 
distinction in the Irish credit statistics is frequently made – see Lydon et al. (2011) 
for example. 
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FIGURE 5 RATIO OF CREDIT ISSUED TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO GNI* (%)  
 
 
Sources:  Central Bank of Ireland and QEC calculations. 
 
The clear increase in the level of credit extended vis-à-vis the overall size of the 
economy prior to 2008 is evident. Since 2010, as both the financial and household 
sector engaged in a significant degree of deleveraging, the ratio of credit has 
fallen substantially; credit levels are back to the rates seen in the mid-1990s. In 
the most recent Commentary (QEC 2018, Autumn), a new financial stability 
indicator was presented. Following Avdjiiev et al. (2018) the ratio of total cross-
border claims to GNI* is calculated. Much of this lending by foreign institutions 
would be to the domestic financial sector; therefore, significant movements in 
cross-border flows could indicate the build-up of imbalances in both the domestic 
economy and domestic credit institutions. In Figure 6 the total of all foreign 
country exposures as a ratio of Irish GNI* is presented. 
 
FIGURE 6 RATIO OF TOTAL CROSS-BORDER FLOWS TO THE IRISH ECONOMY (INDEX: 1999 = 100)  
 
 
Sources:  Central Bank of Ireland and QEC calculations. 
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The ratio illustrates the profound increase in cross-border lending into the Irish 
economy in the period prior to 2008. However, as the impact of the financial 
crisis impacted, the ratio fell significantly before stabilising around 2014. At 
present, the ratio is back to its pre-2002 level. This indicator provides an insight 
into where the vulnerabilities in the Irish banking sector originated. The 
improvements in this ratio suggest the financial stability threat from foreign 
lending into the Irish economy has substantially reduced. 
 
The sectoral allocation of credit is also an important policy issue. Figure 7 
highlights the decline in the ratio of credit extended to the construction and real 
estate sectors – again figures are presented including and excluding credit levels 
issued to the financial sector. 
 
FIGURE 7 RATIO OF CREDIT ISSUED TO THE CONSTRUCTION AND REAL ESTATE SECTORS (%)  
 
 
Sources:  Central Bank of Ireland and QEC calculations. 
 
In both cases, the ratios are at their lowest rates in 20 years. In Figure 8, we 
compare the rate of credit to the household sector in Ireland with other select 
European economies. In particular total credit to the household sector as a 
percentage of GDP is plotted. 
 
In a similar pattern to Figures 5, 6 and 7, the large increase in Irish household 
credit prior to 2008 is evident, however again post that period, the rate of credit 
has now fallen to below the Euro Area average. 
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FIGURE 8 HOUSEHOLD CREDIT-TO-GDP FOR SELECT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (%)  
 
 
Source:  Bank of International Settlements. 
 
To a certain extent, the present low levels of Irish household credit are a function 
of the significant shock experienced by the domestic economy post-2008. They 
also represent the stock of credit at a point in time. In that sense, it is useful to 
examine gross new lending to small and medium sized enterprises in the Irish 
economy to assess which way the stock is likely to move over the short to 
medium term. Figure 9 presents the value of new lending for the construction, 
real estate, and total categories since 2010. 
 
FIGURE 9 GROSS NEW LENDING (€ MILLION) TO SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES  
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland and QEC calculations. 
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Since 2014, new lending across the three categories has begun to increase. In 
particular, the real estate activities category appears to be experiencing 
significant growth over the past year. This suggests that the stocks of credit in the 
construction and real estate categories are set to increase over the short to 
medium term. 
4. CORE INFLATION AND WAGES 
More generally in the economy, the presence of capacity constraints may be 
reflected in movements in core inflation; if an economy is operating at or near its 
potential level and constraints are likely to be binding, then upward pressure may 
be observed in domestic price levels. In evaluating trends in inflationary 
pressures, the core CPI is frequently used as it excludes food and energy prices. 
Both of these components are subject to unpredictable supply shocks that are 
not easily controlled by monetary or fiscal policy. Consequently, from a 
policymakers’ perspective, the core CPI is often argued to be a better measure of 
the underlying inflationary pressures. In Figure 10, the Irish core inflation rate is 
presented.  
 
FIGURE 10 ANNUAL IRISH CORE INFLATION RATE (%)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The Irish economy, like a number of OECD countries, has been experiencing 
persistently low actual and core inflation over the past number of years. While 
there are a number of potential reasons for the low core rate (see Sanchez and 
Kim, 2018, for a recent discussion), it is hard to argue that capacity constraints in 
the domestic economy are binding when inflation rates are so low on such a 
persistent basis.  
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Finally, we examine average weekly earnings in the construction sector to assess 
if potential wage pressures are emerging. Wage levels are available from 2008 
onwards and for three different size categories of firms; those with less than 50 
employees, between 50 and 250 employees and for firms with more than 250 
employees. 
 
FIGURE 11 AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS IN THE IRISH CONSTRUCTION SECTOR (€)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Earnings appear to be relatively stable across the period for all size categories. 
While there appears to be a mild upward trend over the past year, there is little 
evidence of significant wage inflation across the sector.  
5. CONCLUSION 
In this note, the capacity of the Irish economy to meet future expected activity in 
the construction sector has been examined. Given the significant amount of 
policy attention currently focussing on housing supply, particular attention is paid 
to the implications for the supply-side of the economy of future housing activity 
levels. This is examined primarily from the perspective of the labour market and 
the financial sector. 
 
In terms of an overall assessment, the analysis conducted leads to the following 
general conclusions: 
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1. Employment levels in construction compared to those over the past 20 
years are still quite low as is the ratio of employment in construction. 
2. However, given the present low level of housing supply, employment levels 
in relative terms are high, suggesting that, in the absence of significant 
efficiencies, employment levels in construction would have to increase to 
elevated levels in order for increased housing supply to be provided. 
3. It now appears that much of the additional labour required for housing 
supply and other construction and infrastructural work would have to be 
secured through inward net migration; most of this additional labour 
supply would likely come from other European countries or countries 
which traditionally may not have witnessed much migration to the Irish 
economy. 
4. However, the present high cost of accommodation may act as a 
disincentive for workers seeking to come and work, particularly in the 
greater Dublin area. 
5. Credit levels in total are still quite low both by historical and international 
standards, while the amount of credit currently being employed in 
construction is also low on a relative basis. However, recent trends in the 
levels of new lending indicate that the stocks are set to increase. 
 
In summary, the Irish economy would not appear, at present, to be unduly 
constrained in terms of labour market and financial sector developments. An 
examination of Irish core inflation rates indicates that, like many countries, there 
is an absence of significant underlying inflationary pressures in the domestic 
economy. 
 
However, it is clear that a significant increase in housing output, as is official 
Government policy,3 will result in employment levels in construction back to 
levels seen in the run-up to 2007/2008. Such an increase in activity levels will also 
result in a sizeable increase in the provision of credit by domestic financial 
institutions (see Duffy et al., 2016, for more on this). In that regard, as noted in 
previous Commentaries, the presence of macroprudential policy is imperative in 
preventing the build-up of another domestic credit bubble. 
  
 
                                                          
 
3  See http://rebuildingireland.ie.  
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THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE CHANGING PROFILE OF MORTGAGE 
ARREARS  
 
* Mike Fahy, Conor O’Toole and Rachel Slaymaker1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding which households go into mortgage arrears during both boom and 
bust periods in Ireland is of critical importance to ensure suitable policies are 
deployed to safeguard future financial stability. Many of the difficulties in Ireland 
arose from the loosening of underwriting standards by financial institutions. This 
led to excessive household leverage ratios and provided households with limited 
buffers with which to absorb shocks (McCarthy and McQuinn, 2017; Lydon and 
McCann, 2017). The joint effects of labour market difficulties and large falls in 
house prices led to a situation where nearly one-in-five mortgage loans was in 
arrears at the height of the crisis (McCarthy, 2014).  
 
To shed light on the drivers of the arrears crisis, a series of studies have explored 
the relative effects of equity shocks and affordability shocks on Irish mortgage 
holders. Using loan-level data from the Central Bank of Ireland, Kelly and 
O’Malley (2016) and Lydon and McCarthy (2013) estimate double-trigger type 
models which find a role for both the loan-to-value ratio and the unemployment 
rate in driving mortgage default. These studies, and notable others such as 
Gaffney et al. (2014), formed the basis for the mortgage stress test framework for 
loan-loss forecasting that the Central Bank now uses. Recent research by 
O’Malley (2018) also provides judicial and legislative motives for default.  
 
One challenge with existing datasets has been a lack of up-to-date information on 
borrower income which is unavailable in loan-level data. To address this gap in 
the literature, McCarthy (2014) undertook a specific survey to capture current 
income information for mortgage holders and link it back to the loan data. This 
research found that labour shocks and fragile employment explained a large 
share of arrears cases in Ireland.  
 
 
                                                          
 
1  This research is funded under the Macroeconomy, Taxation and Banking Joint Research Programme between the 
Department of Finance and the ESRI. The views presented in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not 
represent the official views of either the Department of Finance or the Economic and Social Research Institute. 
Results are based on analysis of strictly controlled Research Microdata Files provided by the Central Statistics Office 
(CSO). The CSO does not take any responsibility for the views expressed or the outputs generated from this research. 
Any remaining errors are the authors’ own.  
* Conor.OToole@esri.ie ESRI Research Notes 2018/4/2 
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While these studies have provided a very thorough explanation of the arrears 
crisis since 2010, no research has explored the difference in the type of 
household that went into arrears during the systemic crisis relative to the pre-
crisis period. This is mainly due to the lack of loan-level data for the pre-crisis 
period. One notable exception is McCarthy and McQuinn (2011) who focus on 
income in the period just before the severe crisis period 2009/2010. However, 
documentation of the change in mortgage arrears over the crisis period in terms 
of household composition and other characteristics is still missing.  
 
To address this gap in the literature, in this Research Note, we build on the 
existing work by exploring whether the composition of borrowers who went into 
arrears during the height of the financial crisis was different from those who were 
in arrears in the pre-crisis period. We draw on the Irish Survey of Income and 
Living Conditions (SILC) which began in 2003 and is conducted by the Central 
Statistics Office (CSO) on an annual basis. Most importantly, this dataset contains 
a wealth of information on both mortgage debt and socio-economic 
characteristics, enabling us to explore which types of household experienced 
mortgage distress both before and during the crisis.  
 
There are good economic reasons to expect a priori that the types of household 
who experience mortgage repayment distress in normal economic times may 
differ from those who are affected during a systemic crisis following an extensive 
credit boom. For example, in a more stable economic environment, re-
employment probabilities following a job loss are likely to be greater. Individuals 
most likely to experience arrears problems during normal economic times may be 
those whose skill profile does not fit the labour demanded, those who are in low 
paid or fragile employment, and those suffering from adverse personal 
circumstances such as ill health or family problems.  
 
In a systemic crisis, where leverage ratios have increased considerably in the 
preceding period, labour shocks may also permeate to groups in the economy 
that would not be affected in normal times. This may give rise to a very different 
profile of borrowers who enter arrears. Understanding which households will 
likely experience distress across the economic cycle is critical to designing 
structural policies to moderate loan arrears in good and bad times.  
 
We find that in the pre-crisis period, those households in mortgage arrears were 
more likely to have suffered very severe economic, social or other personal 
difficulties including ill health or divorce or separation. Arrears cases were also 
more likely to come from the lower end of the income distribution. Housing 
equity considerations (negative equity) had no bearing on default as house prices 
were rising. In contrast, during the systemic crisis, equity considerations played a 
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role and defaults increased to a greater extent amongst higher income groups 
and those without health or other personal difficulties.  
 
From a policy perspective, it is important to understand what the drivers of 
default will be in non-crisis times. As the Irish economy recovers, it is likely that 
there will be new default cases. However, the reasons for these may be more 
down to unanticipated personal difficulties rather than broad equity or labour 
market shocks. This may require a different policy response for these households.  
 
This Note is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the 
analysis. Section 3 profiles the types of households in arrears before and during 
the financial crisis. Section 4 considers whether financial distress for households 
goes beyond mortgage arrears and also affects their repayment of other loan 
items and bills and Section 5 concludes.  
2. BACKGROUND AND DATA 
To understand the household types which typically fall into mortgage arrears we 
draw on the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC). The SILC provides a 
comprehensive micro-level dataset surveying income and living conditions across 
different types of households (see CSO, 2016). As a survey of private households, 
it is voluntary and is carried out under EU legislation. In Ireland, the survey is 
conducted on an annual basis by the CSO and, while it is primarily focused on 
collecting information used to derive indicators of poverty, deprivation and social 
exclusion, the survey also contains a significant amount of information for each 
household on home ownership, details of mortgage debt, monthly mortgage 
instalments and arrears. In particular, we use information on whether households 
went into mortgage arrears in the last 12 months as our indicator of mortgage 
arrears. 
 
While previous work (Kelly and O’Malley, 2016; Lydon and McCarthy, 2013) has 
used loan-level data to document the extent of arrears in Ireland, these papers 
focus exclusively on the post-crisis period. Furthermore, as these are loan-level 
data, they do not contain household level characteristics. Using SILC data from 
2004-2013 therefore provides us with a unique opportunity to examine the 
incidence of arrears across different types of households and to explore whether 
the composition of borrowers who were in arrears during the height of the 
financial crisis was different from those who went into arrears in the pre-crisis 
period.  
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FIGURE 1 PRIVATE DWELLING HOMES MORTGAGE ARREARS IN IRELAND: A COMPARISON 
BETWEEN SILC AND CBI DATA 
 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office EU-SILC data, and Central Bank of Ireland, Residential Mortgage Arrears data. 
 
Before we use the SILC data for any analysis, we first want to examine how well 
the arrears information correlates with the equivalent Central Bank of Ireland 
data used in existing studies. In Figure 1 we compare the proportion of 
households in mortgage arrears in the SILC data2 to both the Central Bank of 
Ireland’s private dwelling homes (PDH) total arrears outstanding data series and 
the CBI’s over 90 days outstanding data series. The trend in the SILC mortgage 
arrears data is very similar to the trends in both the CBI’s over 90 days 
outstanding data series and the CBI’s PDH total arrears outstanding series. In fact 
from 2009 to 2016, we find that there is an 82 per cent correlation between the 
CBI’s 90 days in arrears data series and the SILC arrears data, and an 88 per cent 
correlation between the CBI’s total outstanding arrears series and the SILC 
arrears data.  
 
 
                                                          
 
2  Information on mortgages in the SILC data refers only to private dwelling homes; it does not contain information on 
buy-to-let or investment properties or on second homes.   
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FIGURE 2 NEGATIVE EQUITY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN SILC AND CBI DATA  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office EU-SILC data, and Central Bank of Ireland data. 
 
In Figure 2 we compare the proportion of households in negative equity in the 
SILC data to the equivalent Central Bank of Ireland figures.3 We can see from 
Figure 2 that the correlation between the two series is very high, with a 
correlation coefficient of 99 per cent during the period 2011-2014 for which we 
have data for both series.  
 
The strong correlations between the SILC and CBI data, both in terms of the share 
of households in arrears and the share of households in negative equity, provides 
a solid empirical basis for using the SILC data to analyse and profile the 
demographic and other household level characteristics behind mortgage arrears 
in Ireland. We can, thus, provide new additional insights into the evolution of 
arrears over time in Ireland. Our particular focus is on examining the periods 
before which Central Bank data are available.  
 
In Figure 3 we plot the regional variation in mortgage arrears during non-crisis 
and crisis years. For the purposes of our analysis throughout this Note, we define 
the non-crisis period as 2004-2009 and the crisis period as 2010-2013. While the 
financial crisis began in 2008, in Ireland the mortgage arrears crisis really began 
to take hold from 2010 onwards. Prior to the crisis there was no significant 
geographical variation in the proportion of households in arrears, with the arrears 
 
                                                          
 
3  We compare the SILC data with the CBI series of the previous year because the CBI negative equity data are reported 
at the end of Q4 each year, whereas in SILC, respondents are interviewed throughout the year and asked to report on 
the previous 12 months. E.g. we compare CBI Q4 2011 with SILC 2012. 
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rate varying between 1 per cent to 4.5 per cent for all regions. An exception to 
this trend is seen in the Western region, which had a slightly higher rate of 6.7 
per cent (see Figure 3a).  
 
In contrast, in Figure 3b we observe significant geographical variation in the 
arrears rate during the crisis period (2010-2013). Although we observe a higher 
arrears rate in all regions, we note the rate was substantially higher in the Border 
and South-East regions where just over one-fifth of households were in arrears, 
and the Midland region with just under 20 per cent of households. These areas, in 
particular, saw a huge construction boom in the early 2000s, with house prices 
increasing substantially relative to incomes. The economies in these areas were 
also heavily reliant on domestic, non-traded products and firms, meaning that 
these areas were particularly vulnerable to large unemployment and income 
shocks during the crisis.  
 
FIGURE 3 SHARE OF HOUSEHOLDS IN MORTGAGE ARREARS BY REGION 
  
 
Source: ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC data.  
 
 
In Figure 4 we explore the correlation in the regional patterns of both 
unemployment and negative equity in Ireland, as unemployment and equity 
shocks are shown to be two important drivers of arrears in the existing literature. 
Figure 4a reinforces the finding that between 2010 and 2013 the Midland, Border 
and South-East regions had much higher levels of mortgage arrears, ranging from 
19 per cent to 21 per cent, compared to 10 per cent to 13 per cent in other 
regions. During this period, the share of households in negative equity was 
b. 2010-2013 a. 2004-2009 
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particularly high in the Midland and to a lesser extent in the Border region. Figure 
4b firstly shows the large increases in unemployment in all regions between the 
pre-crisis and crisis periods. Secondly it shows that in the South-East, 
unemployment, in particular, was high between 2010 and 2013, at approximately 
18 per cent. These correlations suggest that the reasons why households fall into 
arrears may differ across regions. 
 
FIGURE 4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARREARS, NEGATIVE EQUITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT BY 
REGION 
a) Negative Equity 2010-2013 
 
 
b) Unemployment 2004-2009 and 2010-2013 
 
 
Source: ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC data.  
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3. PROFILING ARREARS ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS BEFORE AND DURING 
THE CRISIS 
In this section we explore whether the composition of borrowers who were in 
arrears during the height of the financial crisis was different from those who were 
in arrears in the pre-crisis period. Table 1 presents the predicted probability that 
a household is in arrears for a series of household characteristics in the non-crisis 
period (2004-2009) and crisis period (2010-2013), conditional on controlling for 
other household characteristics.4 Extensive mortgage modification programmes 
came into operation in Ireland after 2013 (see Danne and McGuinness, 2016; and 
McCann, 2017). As these modification programmes are not captured in the SILC 
data, we exclude households in the 2014-2016 waves for the remainder of our 
analysis.5 This is due to the fact that while these households may no longer be in 
arrears due to the modifications, they may still be in significant financial distress. 
In any case, our primary focus in this Note is to explore the differences between 
the composition of borrowers in arrears prior to and during the crisis, for which 
we do not require data from these more recent waves.  
 
Focusing first on the non-crisis years, it is clear that higher predicted probabilities 
of arrears are associated with particular high risk groups, such as those without 
third-level education, households in the lowest 40 per cent of the income 
distribution and especially single adult households with children. In addition, we 
can see that households who suffered an employment, marital or health shock 
were more likely to be in arrears. Between 2004-2009, controlling for other 
characteristics, unemployed households had an 11 per cent likelihood of being in 
mortgage arrears, along with 4 per cent likelihood for those who had suffered 
divorce, separation or became widowed, and a 15 per cent chance for households 
who reported experiencing bad health.  
 
Turning now to the crisis years, from the second column of Table 1 it is clear that 
the likelihood of being in arrears increased for all household types. However, 
from the final column of Table 1 we observe much larger relative increases in 
arrears for households with substantially different characteristics. More precisely, 
the number of employed households in arrears increased five-fold, while 
younger, healthier, and better educated households saw the largest rise in 
arrears, with a seven-fold increase for households with third-level education.  
 
 
                                                          
 
4  We estimate probit regressions and report the predicted probabilities that a household of that characteristic is in 
arrears, holding the other variables at their means.  
5  The SILC data do not capture modifications such as arrears capitalisations and term extensions.  
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Finally, as shown in the final column of Table 1, we observe an almost three-fold 
rise in the arrears rate for households with a loan-to-value ratio greater than 80 
or, put differently, we see the importance of the equity channel coming into play 
in the crisis period. Exploring this in more detail, in Figure 5 we see that prior to 
2009 virtually no households were in negative equity. This corresponds with our 
findings in Table 1 that households in arrears in the non-crisis period tended to be 
those who had suffered an adverse employment, marital or health shock. After 
2009 there was a sharp rise in the share of households in negative equity, and 
this was much greater for households in arrears, peaking at 45-46 per cent 
between 2011 and 2013. Households in negative equity may be more likely to go 
into arrears for several reasons. First, a household may decide to stop making 
mortgage payments when the value of the debt is greater than the value of the 
property, a so-called strategic default. Second, a household faced with both a 
negative equity and an affordability shock may be unable to make mortgage 
payments and unable to sell the property, forcing them into arrears.  
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TABLE 1  MORTGAGE ARREARS BY HOUSEHOLD SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS  
2004-2013  
Characteristic 
Predicted 
Probability of 
Arrears  
2004-2009  
Predicted 
Probability of 
Arrears 
2010-2013  
Percentage 
Point 
Difference 
Percentage 
Change (%) 
Age     
18-35 0.016 0.135 0.119 743.8 
36-50 0.018 0.083 0.065 361.1 
51+ 0.020 0.105 0.085 425.0 
Marital Status     
Married 0.015 0.090 0.075 500.0 
Single 0.021 0.109 0.088 419.0 
Divorced/Separated/Widowed 0.040 0.169 0.129 322.5 
Employment Status     
Employed 0.014 0.086 0.072 514.3 
Unemployed 0.108 0.217 0.109 100.9 
Other 0.031 0.128 0.097 312.9 
Education     
Primary 0.027 0.185 0.158 585.2 
Secondary 0.025 0.108 0.083 332.0 
Third-level 0.011 0.089 0.078 709.1 
Household Composition     
1 adult, no children 0.012 0.048 0.036 300.0 
1 adult, with children 0.087 0.105 0.018 20.7 
2 adults, no children 0.011 0.069 0.058 527.3 
 2 adults, with children 0.023 0.140 0.117 508.7 
Health Status     
Very good/good 0.016 0.091 0.075 468.8 
Fair 0.045 0.189 0.144 320.0 
Bad/very bad 0.151 0.306 0.155 102.6 
Income Distribution     
<p(40) 0.044 0.278 0.234 531.8 
p(40)-p(60) 0.030 0.153 0.123 410.0 
>p(60) 0.013 0.069 0.056 430.8 
Unconditional Proportion of 
Households in Arrears (%) 
0.032 0.128 
0.096 300.0 
Unconditional Proportion of 
Households with LTV>80 (%) 
0.039 0.148 
0.109 279.5 
No. Obs. 6,646 4,335   
 
Source: ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC data. 
Note:  For Columns 1 and 2 we estimate probit regressions and report the predicted probability of arrears for each household 
characteristic, while holding the other variables at their means. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level, except the coefficient on ‘1 adult, no children’ in the 2004-2009 period which is significant at the 5 per cent level. In 
addition, in the last two rows we present the unconditional proportion, i.e. the simple mean, of households in arrears and 
with an LTV>80 as additional information. The mean proportion of households with an LTV>80 is based on a smaller sample 
(4,055 and 2,966 observations respectively) due to missing data. 
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FIGURE 5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEGATIVE EQUITY AND ARREARS 
 
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC data  
Note:  In the period prior to 2008, the actual level of negative equity in Ireland was (near) zero due to rising house prices. We therefore 
have (near) zero values for these years in our data. Due to the small number of households in arrears in certain years prior to 
2009, these observations are simply reported as 0 for 2004-2008.  
4. MORTGAGE ARREARS AND BROADER HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL 
DISTRESS 
In addition to examining the differences between the types of households going 
into arrears in the non-crisis and crisis periods, one additional question of interest 
is to what extent distress in the mortgage market is accompanied by broader 
household financial difficulties. In addition to the basic socio-economic 
characteristics presented so far, the SILC data also contain a series of information 
on broader household financial distress. This provides us with the unique 
opportunity to assess the extent to which distress in the mortgage market was 
accompanied by broader household financial distress.  
 
In Table 2 we can see that in the crisis period, controlling for other characteristics, 
more than one-third of households in arrears on their utility bills and 45 per cent 
of those in consumer loan arrears were also in mortgage arrears. Furthermore, 
one-fifth of households having difficulty or great difficulty making ends meet, 14 
per cent of households unable to save income regularly, and 17 per cent of 
households who were unable to take a family holiday, were in arrears in the crisis 
period. These findings are significant as they clearly show the existence of 
additional broader household financial distress during the crisis period, over and 
above the issue of being in mortgage arrears. However, from the final column of 
Table 2, it is also clear that we observe larger relative increases in arrears for 
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households not in broader financial difficulties. This is consistent with our 
findings in Table 1 that during the systemic crisis, the risk of falling into arrears 
spread throughout society.  
 
TABLE 2  HOUSEHOLDS IN MORTGAGE ARREARS 2004-2013 – BROADER FINANCIAL 
DISTRESS 
Characteristic 
Predicted 
Probability of 
Arrears  
2004-2009 
Predicted 
Probability of 
Arrears  
2010-2013 
Difference 
Percentage 
Change (%) 
Utilities Arrears in last 12 months     
Yes 0.122 0.349 0.227 186.1 
No 0.007 0.096 0.089 1,271.4 
 Consumer Loan Arrears in last 12 months    
Yes 0.061 0.447 0.386 632.8 
No 0.007 0.104 0.097 1,385.7 
Can Regularly Save Some Income     
Yes 0.006 0.114 0.108 1,800.0 
No 0.011 0.141 0.13 1,181.8 
Ability to Make Ends Meet     
With great difficulty/difficulty 0.024 0.19 0.166 691.7 
With some difficulty 0.008 0.100 0.092 1,150.0 
Fairly easily/easily 0.005 0.101 0.096 1,920.0 
Very easily 0.004 0.110 0.106 2,650.0 
Ability to take Annual Family Holiday     
Yes 0.007 0.112 0.105 1,500.0 
No 0.017 0.167 0.15 882.4 
No. Obs. 6,645 4,333   
 
Source: ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC data.  
Note:  For Columns 1 and 2 we estimate probit regressions and report the predicted probability of arrears for each household 
characteristic, while holding the other variables at their means. These regressions also include the household characteristics 
shown in Table 1. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, except the coefficient on ‘yes-consumer 
loan arrears’ in the 2004-2009 period which is significant at the 5 per cent level, and on ‘very easily able to make ends meet’ 
in the 2004-2009 period which is not statistically significant. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this Research Note we provide an examination of the socio-economic 
characteristics of borrowers in mortgage arrears in Ireland. More specifically, we 
explore the change in composition of these borrowers between those in arrears 
in the pre-crisis years and those who went into arrears during the financial crisis.  
 
In Section 2 we show that the SILC data are highly correlated with the CBI data on 
Irish mortgage arrears, and therefore provide a suitable dataset with which to 
analyse and profile the demographic and other household level characteristics 
behind mortgage arrears in Ireland over the period 2004-2013. From a regional 
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perspective, we present descriptive evidence showing that prior to the crisis 
there was no significant geographical variation in the proportion of households in 
arrears; however, in the crisis years we show mortgage arrears rates were 
significantly higher in the Border, Midland and South-East regions. Taking a closer 
look at the equity and unemployment channels which act as a catalyst for a 
household falling into arrears, we show that the relative importance of these 
channels differs across regions. 
 
In Section 3 we find that prior to the crisis, households in mortgage arrears were 
typically those who had suffered unemployment, marital and health shocks, as 
well as particular risk groups such as lone parents. However, during the systemic 
crisis, the risk of falling into arrears spread throughout society, and in fact 
healthier, younger, more highly educated, employed households saw the largest 
increases in incidence of arrears.  
 
Finally, in Section 4 we show that households in mortgage arrears also suffer 
from broader financial distress. In particular, households in arrears on utility bills 
and consumer loans have a much higher likelihood of also being in mortgage 
arrears. However, during the systemic crisis, the risk of falling into arrears spread 
throughout society, and in fact households not in consumer loan or hire purchase 
arrears, as well as those able to make ends meet, saw the largest increases in 
incidence of arrears.  
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BUDGET 2019: TAX AND WELFARE CHANGES  
 
Barra Roantree, Maxime Bercholz, Karina Doorley, Claire Keane, 
Mark Regan and John Walsh1 
ABSTRACT 
In his budget delivered to the Dáil on 9 October, the Minister for Finance, Public 
Expenditure and Reform announced an increase in General Government 
expenditure for 2019 of €4.2 billion, an increase of 5.1 per cent from its 2018 
level. This is to be financed by a small General Government deficit of €75 million. 
 
The majority of this additional expenditure was allocated to capital investment 
and public services, but the government also announced a number of changes to 
the tax and social welfare system in 2019: €711 million in tax increases, €370 
million in tax cuts and €362 million in increased transfers. However, this excludes 
discretionary tax increases announced in the Summer Economic Statement which 
are expected to raise a further €600 million. 
 
This article describes and assesses these reforms, first looking at the main 
taxation measures announced in the budget, before going on to examine the 
social welfare measures. It then considers the effect of these measures as a 
whole on the incomes of households using representative survey data and 
SWITCH, the ESRI’s tax and benefit microsimulation model. The article concludes 
with some brief reflections on some of the fiscal challenges facing the 
government in the coming years.  
2. INTRODUCTION 
In his budget delivered to the Dáil on 9 October, the Minister for Finance, Public 
Expenditure and Reform announced an increase in General Government 
expenditure for 2019 of €4.2 billion, an increase of 5.1 per cent from its 2018 
level. This is to be financed by a small General Government deficit of €75 million. 
 
                                                          
 
1  We are grateful to the CSO for facilitating access to the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) Research 
Microdata File used to construct the database for the SWITCH tax-benefit model, and to the Irish Social Science Data 
Archive for facilitating access to the Household Budget Survey. Funding from the ESRI’s Tax, Welfare and Pensions 
Research Programme (supported by the Departments of Public Expenditure and Reform, Employment Affairs and 
Social Protection, Health, Children and Youth Affairs and Finance) is gratefully acknowledged. We thank an 
anonymous referee for their comments. 
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The majority of this additional expenditure was allocated to capital investment 
and public services, but the government also announced a number of changes to 
the tax and social welfare system in 2019: €711 million in tax increases, €370 
million in tax cuts and €362 million in increased transfers. However, this excludes 
discretionary tax increases announced in the Summer Economic Statement which 
are expected to raise a further €600 million. 
 
This article describes and assesses these reforms, first looking at the main 
taxation measures announced in the budget, before going on to examine the 
social welfare measures. It then considers the effect of these measures as a 
whole on the incomes of households using representative survey data and 
SWITCH, the ESRI’s tax and benefit microsimulation model. The article concludes 
with some brief reflections on some of the fiscal challenges facing the 
government in the coming years. 
 
TAXATION MEASURES 
Table 1 displays the revenue yield or cost of the tax policy measures announced 
in the budget, as estimated by the Department of Finance for 2019 in its ‘Tax 
Policy Changes’ document.2 The single largest revenue raising measure listed was 
the increase in VAT on most goods currently subject to the 9 per cent rate, 
expected to yield €466 million. The next largest measures are increases to excise 
duties on cigarettes and gambling, expected to raise €101 million, and an 
increase in the National Training Fund levy from 0.8 per cent to 0.9 per cent of 
employers’ payrolls, expected to raise €77 million in 2019.  The most expensive 
tax cuts were those to income tax, costing a combined €196 million, and 
reductions in the Universal Social Charge (USC), costing €105 million. This section 
describes these changes, assessing their rationale and potential effects.  
 
The tax cut affecting most individuals is the reduction in the main 4.75 per cent 
rate of USC to 4.5 per cent, and the increase in the threshold at which it begins to 
apply. Approximately 1.7 million individuals with incomes above €19,372 per year 
will pay less USC as a result of the change, with an average gain of €76 per year 
among those affected. The stated rationale for increasing the threshold was to 
ensure someone working ‘full-time’ at the adult minimum wage does not face the 
main rate of USC on an additional hour of work. However, the increase of €502 
per year merely means that from January, someone on the minimum wage of 
€9.80 per hour will face this rate if working more than 39 hours per week, rather 
than 38.  
 
                                                          
 
2  See www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2019/Documents/2.%20Budget%202019%20Tax%20Policy%20Changes.pdf  
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Given evidence on the responsiveness of lower paid workers in Ireland 
(Hargaden, 2018), it is unlikely that facing a 2 percentage point lower rate of USC 
on earnings between €19,372 and €19,874 will have a substantial impact on the 
number of hours employees choose to work. More likely to affect this is a cliff-
edge, or ‘notch’, that exists in the USC schedule at €13,000 per year, where the 
entirety of individuals’ earnings become liable to USC. This means low-paid part-
time workers can be left slightly worse off by a pay increase, or working more 
hours.  
 
A similar cliff-edge, or ‘notch’, exists in the Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI) 
schedule. Most individuals become liable to employee PRSI (4 per cent) on the 
entirety of their earnings at €352 per week, and to the main (8.7 per cent) and 
higher (10.95 per cent) rates of employer PRSI at €38 and €386 per week 
respectively. This creates a strong disincentive to increase earnings above these 
thresholds, as it results in both lower take-home pay and higher employer cost.  
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TABLE 1  2019 YIELD OR COST OF TAX MEASURES ANNOUNCED IN BUDGET 2019 
 € million 
Changes to USC rates and bands -105 
Income tax measures  
   Increase to the standard rate band -138 
   Increase to the home carer tax credit -21 
   Increase to the earned income credit  -27 
   Increase in the deductibility of mortgage interest for landlords -10 
   Expansion of KEEP share-based remuneration programme 0 
Changes to excise duties  
   50c increase in duty on pack of cigarettes 59.4 
   Minimum excise duty on cigarettes  2.4 
   Increase in betting duty 39.5 
VRT  
   Diesel surcharge 25 
   Extension of relief for hybrid & plug-ins -16 
   Extension of 0% BIK rate for electrics -3 
Agritaxation  
   Income averaging  -1 
   Stock relief -8 
VAT  
   Increase in 9% rate 466 
   Reduction in rate on e-publications and e-papers -6 
CAT increase group a threshold -6.9 
Employer PAYE compliance implementation 50 
Corporation tax  
   Film relief -2 
   3-year start up relief -5.7 
  Capital allowances for employer provided fitness & childcare -1.9 
   Accelerated capital allowances for gas propelled vehicles & refuelling equipment -1 
   Exit tax 0 
   CFC rules 0 
Stamp duty: extension young trained farmers relief -15 
Employer PRSI threshold increase -2.5 
National Training Fund levy increase 69 
  
Total 341 
 
Source: Department of Finance, ‘Budget 2019 Tax Policy Changes’, available at www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2019/2019.aspx  
Note:  Cost or yield in 2019. Full-year effect different in many cases. Excludes revenue raised from holding tax credits and thresholds 
fixed in cash terms, as discussed below.  
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The budget announced an increase to the latter employer PRSI threshold on the 
recommendation of the Low Pay Commission, to reduce the likelihood that 
someone working full-time on the minimum wage will face these sharp 
disincentives. However, the announced increase is quite small, and still means 
that those employing workers for more than 39 hours a week at the minimum 
wage face a jump in employer cost of €451 per year at the threshold, 
disincentivising them from offering such employees additional hours of work or 
pay rises. 
 
The government also announced an increase in the rate at which the National 
Training Fund Levy (NTFL) is charged against employees earnings, from 0.8 per 
cent to 0.9 per cent. The NTFL was introduced in 2000, replacing the previous 
Apprentice Levy, and is collected through the same payroll system – and levied on 
the same base – as employer PRSI. Despite being earmarked for expenditure on 
training and education programmes, the NTFL is best thought of as economically 
equivalent to employer PRSI.3 
 
Alongside these small reductions in USC and PRSI, the government also 
announced an increase to the Earned Income Tax Credit self-employed workers 
can claim from €1,150 to €1,350, at a cost of €27 million in 2019 and €48 million 
in the longer run. This reduces – but does not eliminate – the less favourable 
income tax treatment of the self-employed, who will also continue to face a 3 per 
cent USC surcharge on incomes over €100,000 not levied on employees. 
 
However, economic activity carried out via self-employment is subject to less 
PRSI than that carried out through employment. This is because while the main 
Class A (employee) and Class S (self-employed) rates of PRSI are the same (4 per 
cent), employers are required to make PRSI contributions of between 8.6 per 
cent and 10.95 per cent on behalf of their employees. This can create a 
substantial gap in the total tax burden associated with each form of employment.  
 
For example, Figure 1 shows that a gross employee salary of €40,000 is associated 
with €12,743 in tax overall: the sum of €5,640 in income tax, €1,123 in USC, and 
€5,980 in PRSI (€1,600 in employee PRSI and €4,380 in employer PRSI). A similar 
self-employment income is associated with €8,663 in tax overall: the sum of 
€5,940 in income tax, €1,123 in USC but only €1,600 of PRSI. Such a gap in the 
 
                                                          
 
3  The National Training Fund has run a surplus in each year since 2015, and has previously been topped up from 
general taxation when there was a financial shortfall: it is unclear why one would want to link the amount spent on 
education and training programmes to the revenue raised from a specific tax, especially one likely to decline during a 
recession when education and training programmes may have particularly beneficial effects. 
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overall tax burden across legal forms may distort individuals’ choices, leading 
some people to operate as self-employed when they would otherwise prefer to 
be employed.4 
 
FIGURE 1 TOTAL INCOME TAX, USC AND PRSI ASSOCIATED WITH ANNUAL INCOME OF €40,000 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.   
Notes:  Assumes single individual with no income tax deductions beyond the standard Personal and PAYE/Earned Income tax credit, 
liable to Class A employee and employer PRSI if employed, and Class S PRSI if self-employed. Employer PRSI includes National 
Training Fund Levy of 0.9 per cent.  
 
Budget 2019 also announced an increase to the Home Carer’s Tax Credit, from 
€1,200 to €1,500. This is an income tax credit given to married couples or civil 
partners who are jointly assessed for income tax purposes, where one adult has 
income under €7,200 and looks after a dependant in the home. Combined with 
the nominal freeze to personal and employee tax credits (discussed below), the 
change increases the incentive for lower income couples with children or adult 
dependants to have just one adult in work compared to two. It is unclear whether 
this is the intended aim of the policy, given the Government has previously 
indicated their desire to reduce the barriers faced by mothers working outside 
the home.5 
 
 
                                                          
 
4  Adam et al. (2017) assess the rationale for reduced rates of tax on the self-employed.     
5  See, for example, the speech given by Taoiseach Leo Varadkar to the Congress of Women’s Caucuses in Sept. 2018, 
https://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/News/Taoiseach's_Speeches/Speech_of_An_Taoiseach_Leo_Varadkar_T_D_Cong
ress_of_Women%E2%80%99s_Caucuses_10_September_2018.html 
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Higher income dual-earner couples, by contrast, are the group who gain most 
from the €750 increase in the standard rate cut-off, above which incomes are 
subject to the higher 40 per cent rate of income tax. This measure increases the 
point at which single adults face the higher rate to €35,300, with jointly assessed 
one-earner couples seeing this rise to €44,300. Jointly assessed two-earner 
couples with sufficiently high incomes, however, can benefit twice, and see the 
point at which they start to pay the higher threshold increase up to a maximum 
of €70,600. Overall, the change will benefit the approximately one-quarter of 
families that contain a higher rate taxpayer, at a cost of €140 million in 2019 (and 
€160 million in future years).  
 
This increase was well flagged in advance of the budget, and much discussion of 
the measure appeared to conflate average with marginal tax rates. The standard 
rate cut-off is the point at which taxpayers begin to pay 40 per cent of any 
additional earnings in income tax, not where they begin to pay 40 per cent of 
their earnings overall in tax. While this threshold is comparatively low by 
European standards, particularly for single adults, the point at which taxpayers 
begin to pay income tax at all is comparatively high. As a result, workers at 
average levels of earnings in Ireland pay relatively little income tax as a share of 
their earnings (OECD, 2018).  
 
Although this reform strengthens financial work incentives for those taxpayers 
brought into the basic rate band (by reducing the marginal rate they face from 40 
per cent to 20 per cent), it is unlikely to have significant effects on aggregate 
employment or labour supply. This is because most of those affected see only a 
reduction in the overall amount of income tax they pay, with their marginal 
income tax rate left unchanged. This represents a pure ‘income effect’, which is 
likely to induce reductions, not increases, in labour supply as individuals can 
obtain the same level of consumption with fewer hours of work. Empirical 
evidence for Ireland also suggests that employees at the level of earnings where 
individuals do see reductions in their marginal tax rate – what matters for the 
‘substitution effect’ that induces increases in labour supply – are relatively 
unresponsive to tax changes.6 
 
While not described as such in Minister Donohoe’s Financial Statement or the 
Department of Finance’s ‘Tax Policy Changes’ document, the decision to hold 
both personal and employee tax credits fixed in nominal terms, alongside most 
PRSI and USC thresholds, amounted to an effective tax increase for many 
 
                                                          
 
6  Acheson et al. (2018) show that there is little ‘bunching’ in the distribution of earnings around the standard rate cut-
off, which indicates that employees around this level of earnings are relatively unresponsive to changes in tax rates.    
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workers. This is because inflation erodes the value of tax credits and thresholds 
that are specified in nominal terms, with wage growth leading to ‘fiscal drag’: an 
increase in the real tax burden on individuals and, correspondingly, in Exchequer 
revenues. Indeed the government counts the freezing of tax thresholds and 
credits as a discretionary revenue raising measure in its calculations of fiscal 
space available under the expenditure benchmark of the EU Stability and Growth 
Pact.7 The inconsistent treatment of these measures in the budgetary 
documentation serves only to reduce transparency about the effects of the 
budget on households. 
 
In addition to direct tax reforms, Budget 2019 announced a number of indirect 
tax changes, mostly increases. Foremost among these was a rise in the rate of 
VAT levied on most goods currently subject to second reduced rate of 9 per cent, 
to 13.5 per cent. This includes the supply of food and drink in catering, hotel 
lettings, theatrical performances and hairdressing services, although newspapers, 
magazines and maps will continue to be taxed at 9 per cent (alongside e-
publications, previously taxed at the main rate of 23 per cent). This second 
reduced rate of VAT was introduced in July 2011 as a temporary measure and 
was supposed to expire in December 2013. However, it was retained by 
successive governments who cited the potential effects on tourism related 
sectors of the economy. Two recent reports, by the Department of Finance and 
the Revenue Commissioners,8  found limited evidence of the VAT cut on 
employment or economic activity in affected sectors, while evaluations of a 
similar VAT cut in France suggests that owners of restaurants and hotels are likely 
to have been the main beneficiaries (Benzarti and Carloni, 2018). 
 
More generally, the IMF, OECD and European Commission have all called for the 
elimination or review of reduced and zero rates of VAT, along with exemptions.9 
These distort consumption decisions towards tax advantaged goods, and lead to 
complexities in policing the boundaries between similar goods with different tax 
treatment. While arguments in favour of lower rates of VAT on certain goods are 
generally grounded in equity concerns, the existence of a modern, sophisticated 
tax and benefit system provides a much more effective way of meeting these 
 
                                                          
 
7  See Table 3 in the Government’s Summer Economic Statement (available at www.finance.gov.ie/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/20180622-SES-2018.pdf) and Table 4 in the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council’s 2019 Pre-Budget 
Statement, available at www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Pre-Budget-2019-Statement.pdf. 
8  Department of Finance (2018) and Revenue Commissioners (2018). 
9  See IMF 2018 Article IV Consultation (www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/06/28/Ireland-2018-Article-IV-
Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-46026), OECD (2018). Economic Survey of Ireland 
(www.oecd.org/ireland/economic-survey-ireland.htm) and European Commission (2017). European Semester country 
report (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-european-semester-country-report-ireland-en.pdf).   
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concerns, by levying (progressive) income taxes and making cash transfers that 
vary with people’s characteristics and needs.10  
 
One area where there is a strong economic case for differentiated, higher rates of 
taxation is goods whose consumption generate negative effects, or externalities, 
on others. Budget 2019 announced increases in the duties levied on cigarettes, 
tobacco and gambling: all of which can be argued to fulfil these criteria. However, 
duties on alcohol, motor fuel and carbon – which also generate substantial 
negative externalities – were held fixed in cash terms, amounting to a 1.1 per 
cent real terms cut given current inflation forecasts. The decision to freeze 
carbon taxes for the fifth successive year means these now stand 2 per cent 
lower in real terms than when set at their current rate of €20 per tonne in 2014. 
This is well below the rate of €80 per tonne suggested as necessary by the 
Climate Change Advisory Council to meet the Government’s own emission 
reduction targets.11 Recent ESRI research (De Bruin and Yakut, 2018) estimates 
that even a doubling of the current rate of carbon tax to €40 would result in only 
a 5 per cent decrease in emissions. Delaying taking action raises the prospect of 
large European Union fines, along with the size of future carbon tax increases 
that will ultimately be needed.  
 
Finally, the government announced a number of other changes to the tax system 
with revenue implications of less than €10 million in 2019, including an above 
inflation increase in the threshold above which Capital Acquisitions Tax applies to 
gifts and inheritances from parents to their children; reductions in taxation on 
farmers and the agricultural sector; increases (reductions) in Vehicle Registration 
Tax for diesel (hybrid) vehicles; and small changes to corporation tax, reliefs and 
allowances.  
 
BENEFIT MEASURES 
Budget 2019 saw a number of changes announced to benefit payments made by 
the Department of Employment and Social Protection (DEASP). The entire 
package (listed in Table 2) was estimated by the Department to cost €362 million 
in 2019, but because many measures will only take effect from March, the full-
year cost is estimated to be almost €500 million per year. 
 
 
                                                          
 
10  For a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see Chapters 6-9 of Mirrlees et al. (2011).  
11  Climate Change Advisory Council’s Annual Review 2018, available at www.climatecouncil.ie. 
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TABLE 2  MAIN DEASP MEASURES ANNOUNCED IN BUDGET 2019 
 
Cost in 2019 
€m 
€5 increase in the maximum weekly personal rates of benefit payment from March 2019, 
with smaller increases for qualified adults and reduced rates of payment. 
268.7 
Increases for Qualified Children to rise by €2.20 per week for children aged under 12 and by 
€3 per week for children aged over 12 from March 2019. 
20.9 
Increase the earnings disregard for One Parent Family Payment and Jobseekers Transitional 
Payment by €20, from €130 per week to €150 per week. 
5.3 
Increase rate of Back to School Clothing and Footwear Allowance by €25. 6.6 
Extend number of weeks Winter Fuel Payment made by one week, to 28 weeks. 8.4 
Increase in the Daily Expenses Allowance rate paid to those in direct provision from €21.60 
per week to €38.74 for adults and €29.80 for children. 
3.1 
Working Family Payment (formerly known as Family Income Supplement): new maintenance 
income disregard of €95.23 per week for housing costs, with the remainder assessed at 50%. 
10.8 
New paid parental leave scheme of two weeks each per parent, based on contribution 
conditions of Maternity/Paternity Benefit from November 2019. 
1.5 
Extension of (contributory) Jobseekers Benefit to the self-employed. 2.0 
Other, including extension in payment of Domiciliary Care Allowance for three months in 
cases where the care recipient dies; and free school meals pilot. 
13.9 
Total cost of announced measures in 2019 362 
 
Source: ‘2019 Expenditure Report’, available at www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2019/2019.aspx  
Note:  Cost in 2019. Full-year effect different in many cases. 
 
The largest change was a €5 increase in the maximum weekly rates of most 
benefit payments from 25 March 2019, costing €268.7 million next year and €349 
million per year thereafter.12 However, given that the rise will not take effect until 
almost quarter of the way through 2019, this is closer to a €4 per week increase. 
By announcing the increase as a flat-rate cash amount, this corresponds to a 
proportionately smaller increase in larger benefits: for example, the maximum 
rate of Jobseekers Allowance for a single adult aged 26 or above will increase by 
about 2 per cent across the year on average (above forecast inflation of 1.1 per 
cent, but below forecast wage growth of 2.9 per cent), but by 3.7 per cent for 
those aged 24 or under. This is as the latter group have been entitled to much 
lower weekly rates of payment since 2014, but will see the same cash increase 
from March. This is unlikely to represent a conscious decision to increase the 
 
                                                          
 
12  Larger increases were announced to the Daily Expenses Allowance paid to those in direct provision, and to the Back 
to School Clothing and Footwear Allowance. Although the basic rate of payment was held fixed in cash terms, the 
Winter Fuel Payment was effectively increased by 3.7 per cent due to the increase in the number of weeks covered 
from 27 to 28. 
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relative generosity of benefits with lower maximum rates of payments, but is the 
ultimate effect of the policy.  
 
The government also announced that Increases for Qualified Children (IQCs) – 
awarded on top of personal rates of payment for most benefits – will from March 
be higher for children aged 12 and above, to reflect the greater costs associated 
with older children. However, there is now a substantial body of evidence that 
early childhood represents a formative stage of life, and that cash payments to 
low-income families can have significant, long-run effects on health and 
economic outcomes in later life (Almond and Currie, 2011; Hoynes et al., 2016). 
Higher payments to families with younger children may therefore provide greater 
insurance against the negative consequences that spells of unemployment or 
disability can have on children, so it is unclear that differentiating IQCs on the 
basis of age in the manner proposed by the government necessarily represents a 
more effective use of resources.  
 
In addition to changes in weekly rates of payments, claimants of Working Family 
Payment (WFP, formerly known as Family Income Supplement, or FIS) will from 
March be able to disregard from the WFP means test up to €93.23 per week of 
maintenance income received for the purposes of housing costs, with 50 per cent 
of maintenance income above this amount deducted from their WFP award. Lone 
parents in receipt of One Parent Family Payment will also see an increase in the 
amount they can earn before having their payment reduced, due to a €20 
increase in the earnings disregard from €130 to €150 per week. This almost 
restores the disregard in real terms to what it was at the end of 2011 (€150.95 in 
today’s prices), and strengthens the financial incentive for lone parents to be in 
paid work. Bargain et al. (2014) found that single mothers in Ireland are 
particularly responsive to financial incentives, suggesting that this change could 
be expected to lead to higher employment among this group.  
 
A new Parental Benefit is to be introduced from November 2019, paid at the 
same rate as Maternity Benefit and Paternity Benefit. While full details of the 
scheme are yet to be announced, it is expected to provide two additional weeks 
of paid leave from work to each new parent who has a sufficient history of PRSI 
contributions. Changes to subsidies paid under the Affordable Childcare Subsidy 
scheme were also announced, the most substantial of which increased the point 
at which means-tested subsidies begin to be withdrawn against income from 
€22,700 to €26,000, and raised the maximum income threshold from €47,500 to 
€60,000. This will mean that more families higher up the income distribution will 
be eligible for the scheme when it is fully rolled out, with most of those eligible 
entitled to a larger subsidy. 
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Finally, the budget announced that eligibility for Jobseekers Benefit will be 
extended to the self-employed, without any corresponding increase in PRSI 
contributions. Jobseekers Benefit is currently a non-means-tested contributory 
benefit, payable for up to nine months following loss of employment to those 
with a history of Class A or Class H PRSI contributions. Self-employed workers are 
already entitled to Jobseekers Allowance (a means-tested version of Jobseekers 
Benefit) or supplementary welfare allowance (a means-tested basic weekly 
allowance payable to those with no other source of income) if their business 
closes down or they experience a significant decline in income. 
 
Lack of eligibility to certain contributory benefits has traditionally been advanced 
as a reason for why the self-employed pay less PRSI than employees, as described 
in Section 2. However, the extension of eligibility to Jobseekers Benefit for the 
self-employed without an increase in the rates of PRSI they pay undermines this 
argument. Indeed, the Department of Finance (2016) noted that an actuarial 
review of the Social Insurance Fund found an ‘incremental increase in 
contribution rates from 4 per cent to 16 per cent would be required if Jobseeker’s 
Benefit in addition [to] core State Pension (contributory) is provided’ to the self-
employed. 
 
While the appropriate balance between the contributory and non-contributory 
nature of the tax and benefit system ultimately depends on a government’s 
preferences for redistribution, insurance and the strength of financial work 
incentives, further loosening the link between PRSI and benefit payments 
represents a departure from the previous stated government policy of moving ‘to 
a contributory European-style social insurance system’.13 
 
GAINS, LOSSES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL  
We now consider the impact of the announced tax and benefit measures as a 
whole on the incomes of households. To do this, we use SWITCH, the ESRI’s tax 
and benefit microsimulation model, along with large-scale representative survey 
data on households’ incomes and expenditures. We examine the impact of 
measures (listed in the Appendix) on the incomes of households, compared to 
what would have happened had tax and benefit thresholds, excise duties and 
benefit payments risen in line with forecast average wage growth. 
 
 
                                                          
 
13  See, for example, http://leovaradkar.ie/2016/06/varadkar-sets-out-his-plans-for-department-of-social-protection.  
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We compare the effect of announced policies relative to this wage-indexed 
counterfactual as it provides a neutral benchmark that will tend to hold inequality 
and the size of the State constant over time. Were we to examine the effect of 
announcements relative to their 2018 levels (a nominal freeze) or to a price-
indexed counterfactual (where thresholds, duties and benefit payments rise in 
line with a measure of price inflation), real wage growth would lead to both an 
increase in the tax burden as a share of GDP/GNP, and to the incomes of 
households in receipt of benefits falling behind those of households containing 
individuals in work.  
 
While the Government adopts the former (nominal freeze) approach in their 
Social Impact Assessment of budgetary policy, leading to very different results to 
those described below, policy has in practice been to increase tax and benefit 
thresholds and payments by at least real wage growth over the medium to longer 
run (Callan et al., 2018). Moreover, as noted in Section 2, the government has in 
recent years treated the freezing of tax thresholds and credits as a discretionary 
policy measure in the calculation of available ‘fiscal space’, indicating that the 
default policy is for these to rise annually. Comparison of budgetary measures to 
a wage-indexed baseline therefore also has the attraction of corresponding to de 
facto – if not explicitly stated – government policy. 
 
To calculate the effect of changes in tax and benefit policies on households, we 
use household survey data from the 2015 Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
(SILC) and the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey (HBS). Monetary variables are 
uprated to 2019 terms, with SWITCH then used on SILC data to calculate 
households’ income tax liabilities and benefit entitlements under the announced 
2019 tax and benefit system, and under a counterfactual 2019 system whose 
thresholds and maximum benefit payments have been increased by forecast 
average wage inflation (2.9 per cent, from the ESRI’s 2019 Autumn Quarterly 
Economic Commentary).14 The HBS is used to estimate the indirect taxes paid by 
households (including VAT, duties, and carbon taxes) under announced 2019 
rates and a counterfactual 2019 indirect tax system where duties and carbon 
taxes rise in line with forecast wage inflation.15 The cost of the measures we 
 
                                                          
 
14  The SWITCH model provides a detailed and accurate representation of almost all aspects of the personal tax and 
benefit system. It does not include taxes on businesses (like corporation tax) which are difficult to assign to individual 
households, or expenditure on public services, which unlike cash transfers provided through the benefit system, are 
conceptually difficult to assign a value to (O’Dea and Preston, 2014). It can, however, be used to examine entitlement 
to Medical or GP Visit Cards.  
15  These estimates are produced using code jointly developed with officials from the Department of Finance as part of 
the ESRI’s ‘Tax, Welfare and Pensions’ research programme. All responsibility for the interpretation of these results is 
the authors’ own. 
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consider is around €520 million in 2019, €40 million more than the budget 
measures announced excluding the rise in VAT.  
 
Relative to this wage-indexed benchmark, the measures in Budget 2019 result in 
an average loss equal to 0.66 per cent of household disposable income. This is 
primarily a result of changes to direct taxes and benefits, which account for more 
than three-quarters of the overall average loss. Indirect taxes account for only 
0.11 percentage points of this loss, with real cuts to other duties and carbon 
taxes offsetting VAT increases. 
 
FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF TAX AND BENEFIT CHANGES 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey, and SWITCH run on 2015 Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions data, both uprated to 2019 prices.  
Notes:  Deciles are based on equivalised household income, using CSO national equivalence scales. 
 
However, these losses are not equally distributed. Figure 2 illustrates the impact 
of the measures across the distribution of household income, adjusted for family 
size, with the population divided into ten equally sized groups, or deciles, ordered 
from lowest to highest income, left to right. The columns show that losses as a 
share of household disposable income are on average largest for the third lowest 
income decile (0.94 per cent) and smallest for the highest income decile (0.37 per 
cent). With the exception of the very lowest income decile, households in the 
bottom half of the income distribution (deciles 2-5) lose by more than those in 
the upper half.  
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This pattern is driven by the nominal freeze (real cut) to personal and employee 
tax credits and to PRSI thresholds, which increase the taxes paid on earnings by 
households in the bottom half of the distribution. Households in the lowest 
income decile tend not to have sufficiently high incomes to pay tax, so are less 
affected by these changes, but do lose from the below wage indexation of benefit 
payments which make up a substantial share of their disposable incomes. The 
upper half of the income distribution see smaller losses because of USC 
reductions and the increases to the standard rate cut-off, but still lose on average 
because of the real cuts to personal and PAYE tax credits and the rise in indirect 
taxes. 
 
While indirect tax increases play a secondary role in shaping the distributional 
pattern of overall losses, the solid blue series in Figure 3 shows these look slightly 
regressive, with larger losses as a percentage of income for lower income deciles.   
 
However, this impression is misleading, and arises mainly because, at any given 
point in time, low-income households typically spend a lot (and therefore pay a 
lot of indirect taxes) relative to their incomes. But households cannot spend more 
than their income indefinitely. Over a lifetime, income and expenditure must be 
equal (except for bequests given and received and the possibility of dying in 
debt); households spending a lot relative to their income at any given point in 
time are often those experiencing only temporarily low incomes and either 
borrowing or running down their savings in order to maintain their expenditure 
smoothly at a level more befitting their lifetime resources.16 
 
 
                                                          
 
16  Such temporarily low incomes can arise for a variety of reasons: people who are temporarily unemployed, students, 
those taking time out of the labour market to raise children, retirees drawing on past savings, and so on. 
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FIGURE 3 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF INDIRECT TAX CHANGES 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey, and SWITCH run on 2015 Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions data, both uprated to 2019 prices.  
Notes:  Deciles are based on equivalised household income, using the CSO national equivalence scales. 
 
We can get a clearer picture of the distributional impact of indirect tax changes 
over a lifetime – abstracting from how much people are borrowing or saving at 
any point in time – by looking at changes as a percentage of expenditure, rather 
than income. The dashed lighter blue series in Figure 3 shows that on this basis, 
the indirect tax changes announced by the Government in Budget 2019 look 
broadly progressive. Average losses as a percentage of expenditure are larger for 
higher income households than for lower income households. This is because 
higher income households tend to spend a larger proportion of their overall 
expenditure on goods which were subject to an increase in VAT (hotel 
accommodation, food and catering services, theatre tickets etc.), and these losses 
exceed the real cuts to non-tobacco duties and carbon taxes.  
 
The measures announced in the budget also have a differential impact across 
different types of households. Table 3 shows that retired couples and lone 
parents saw larger than average losses as a percentage of disposable income 
relative to our wage-indexed benchmark. This is because transfers from the State 
make up a large proportion of income for most of these households, while 
couples without children – who saw the smallest overall losses – are on average 
less reliant on State transfers, and include many higher earning couples who 
benefit twice over from USC reductions and the increase to the standard rate 
threshold.  
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TABLE 3  AVERAGE LOSSES AS A PERCENTAGE OF DISPOSABLE INCOME, BY FAMILY TYPE 
Household type Direct Indirect Total 
Single adult -0.50 -0.13 -0.63 
Lone parent -0.83 -0.11 -0.95 
Couple with children -0.56 -0.09 -0.65 
Couple without children -0.40 -0.13 -0.53 
Single adult, retired -0.97 -0.09 -1.07 
Couple, retired -0.82 -0.11 -0.93 
Other -0.45 -0.11 -0.56 
All -0.55 -0.11 -0.66 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey, and SWITCH run on 2015 Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions data, both uprated to 2019 prices.  
Notes:  Other family type grouping includes households containing multiple single adults and families. 
 
Under the assumption that men and women in couples do not pool their income, 
we can also examine differences in the impact of measures by gender. On 
average, women saw larger losses (0.73 per cent) as a share of disposable income 
than men (0.41 per cent). This difference is largely attributable to the differential 
impact of the measures on men and women with children who are in one-earner 
or no-earner couples. Women with children in one-earner couples lost 1.76 per 
cent of disposable income while women in no-earner couples with children lost 
1.48 per cent of disposable income. The corresponding figures for men were  
-0.37 per cent and +0.20 per cent, respectively. This continues a pattern 
identified in recent ESRI research for women with children to be affected more by 
budgetary policy as a share of their disposable income than their male 
counterparts (Doorley et al., 2018). 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has described and assessed changes to the tax and benefit system 
announced in Budget 2019. Relative to a neutral benchmark, where all 
thresholds, duties and benefit payments rose in line with forecast wage growth, 
the budget is a small net takeaway from households on average, with larger 
proportional losses for lone parents, retirees, and lower income households. We 
conclude by reflecting briefly on some risks to the public finances facing the 
Government. 
 
As highlighted by the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council and the Parliamentary Budget 
Office, the Exchequer has over recent years become increasingly reliant on 
receipts from corporation tax, which are highly volatile and concentrated among 
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a small number of firms.17 This leaves revenues highly vulnerable to the 
relocation of even one large company, changes in the international tax 
environment, or a large macroeconomic shock (such as a no-deal Brexit). 
 
These risks suggest the government may want to look for other more stable 
sources of revenue in future budgets. Increases to carbon taxes seem one 
obvious source of such revenues, given these are likely to be needed to meet 
Ireland’s 2030 EU emissions targets without incurring substantial costs through 
the purchase of other countries’ emission allowances.18  
 
Another source of risk to the public finances is the tendency of successive 
governments to announce current expenditure measures with much larger long-
run than first-year revenue implications. For example, while the cost of the 
benefit changes announced in the budget is €361.6 million in 2019, it is almost 
€500 million (40 per cent larger) in subsequent years. This is not mirrored by the 
profile of tax rises, which are expected to raise €341 million in 2019 and €361 
million subsequently, meaning the net annual long-run cost of announced tax and 
benefit measures (€136 million) is more than six times as large as in 2019 (€20 
million). As it stands, no provision has been made in departmental expenditure 
ceilings to account for these known costs, or for additional recruitment and 
resources in the areas of education, justice and health.19  
 
A further source of risk to the public finances is the recurring announcement – 
late in the year it is to be paid – of the Christmas bonus: an extra payment for 
people in receipt of certain social welfare benefits. The recent budget announced 
that this is to be paid in 2018 at a rate equal to 100 per cent of eligible 
individuals’ normal weekly benefit payment. This requires a supplementary 
estimate to be passed by the Dáil, and either for expenditure elsewhere to be 
underspent, revenues to exceed forecasts, or an increase in borrowing. The 
public finances would be better served by the government announcing the rate of 
this payment at the same time as other welfare payments, at whatever rate is 
deemed appropriate to meet distributional and other policy objectives. Such a 
decision would also benefit lower-income households by removing needless 
uncertainty about whether the Christmas bonus will be paid in full (as this year), 
at a reduced rate (as between 2014 and 2017), or at all (as between 2009 and 
2013).   
 
                                                          
 
17  See the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council’s ‘Pre-Budget 2019 Statement’ and Parliamentary Budget Office’s ‘Pre-Budget 
2019 Commentary’. The former notes that close to 40 per cent of total corporation tax receipts are paid by just ten 
companies. 
18  See the Climate Change Advisory Council’s Annual Review 2018, available at www.climatecouncil.ie.  
19  See p.43 of the Expenditure Report 2019, published at www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2019/2019.aspx.  
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APPENDIX 
The SWITCH model provides a detailed and accurate representation of almost all 
aspects of the Irish personal tax and benefit system. It does not include taxes on 
businesses (like corporation tax), which are difficult to assign to individual 
households, or expenditure on public services, which unlike cash transfers 
provided through the benefit system, are conceptually difficult to assign a value 
to (O’Dea and Preston, 2014). 
 
The main measures we include in our analysis of Budget 2019 using SWITCH are: 
 Changes to maximum personal rates of social welfare payments, Increases 
for Qualified Adults and Increases for Qualified Children; 
 Changes to income tax credits and the standard rate band; 
 Reduction in 4.75 per cent rate of USC and changes to USC thresholds; 
 Reduction in mortgage interest relief; 
 Freeze to employee PRSI thresholds; 
 Freeze to child benefit and FIS/WFP income limits; 
 Increase in number of weeks Fuel Allowance payable and freeze to basic 
amount and income limits; 
 Increase in One Parent Family Payment earnings disregard; 
 Freeze in Household Benefits package; 
 Back to School Allowance increases and freeze to income limits; 
 Freeze to Rent and Mortgage Supplement thresholds. 
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